Descending-bid auction. There are 11 buyers bidding for one item in a descending- bid auction. Assume that buyer valuations follow a uniform(0.1) distribution. (a) What is the optimal bidding function b(v) in a symmetric equilibrium? (b) What is the expected surplus for a buyer with valuation v? (c) What is the expected revenue for the seller? (d) Suppose that the valuations of the 11 buyers are: % = 0.427 22/2 0.559 Vs = 0.316 VA = 0.611 15 = 0.614 26 0.324 V7 = 0.798 28 = 0.570 19 0.598 10 0.125 11 = 0.171 Answer the following: i. Which buyer wins the auction? ii. What is the winning bid? (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) iii. What price does the winner pay? Note that this equals the revenue that the seller receives. iv. What surplus does the winner receive?