DesignCapturing the incentives described above, our experimental design is as follows. In each of ten rounds participants are randomly and anonymously assigned to groups of three. Members of the group are then given two minutes to make an investment (volunteering) decision. Individual earnings are $1. in the event that no one invests before the end of the two minutes. If one group member makes the investment, the round ends, and the individual making the investment secures a payment of $1 .25, while the other two group members each receive $2. The investor is randomly determined in the event that multiple parties simultaneously invest. With no cost of waiting. investments will be made in the last second of the wad and the game reduces to one of simultaneous moves. Accounting for the possibility of ties, the game gives rise to three types of equilibiia: a pure strategy asymmetric Nash equiliba where one individual invests and the others do not: a mixed strategy symmetric equilibrium where each player invests 23.2 percent of the time; and a mixed strategy asymmetric equilibrium where one person does not invest and the two others invest 40 percent of the time. Depending on the equilibrium selected, the probability that an investment occurs is 100 percent, 54 percent, or 64 percent, respectively.8