Discussion question Tversky and Kahneman [1] asked a group of subjects to carry out the following task. They were told that: Linda is 31, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy in college. As a student, she was deeply concerned with racial discrimination and other social issues, and participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. The subjects were then asked to rank the likelihood of various alternatives, such as: (1) Linda is active in the feminist movement. [2) Linda is a bank teller. [3) Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement. Tversky and Kahneman found that between 85 and 90 percent of the subjects rated alternative [1) most likely, followed by [3) and then [2). Do you agree? Tversky and Kahnenian call this phenomenon the conjlmction fallacy, and note that it appears to be lmaffected by prior training in probability or statistics. Do you agree that this phenomenon is a fallacy? Why or why not? If you agree with Tversky and Kahnenian, that this phenomenon is a. fallacy, can you give a possible explanation for the subjects' choices? References [1] A. Tversky and D. Kahneman. Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychoiogicoi Review, 90(4):293315, 1983