Do workers always work harder under control?

Can you briefly comment on the following paper? For me, it's difficult to understand the paper. It would be really nice if you comment in a very understandable way.

Structure of the Comment:

a) Briefly explain the topic and the contents of the paper,

b) then turn to the judgment - What went well? What can be improved? Add questions if necessary.

c) finally ask questions to the author.

d) Add criticism if the original source deserves it, especially if the paper has failed to mention this.

e) Simplify the models for the comment.

f) Find real-world examples/case studies where the topic is relevant.

agent, the ability to assign the computerbased agent has increased the legitimacy of {possible} control. The structure of the ENDOWMENT treatment corresponds to that of the BASELINE. However, this is modied to the extent that the control serves to protect against theft. In addition, Schnedler and 1'v'adovic {EDI 1] divide the effect of control costs into a direct and indirect effect. The direct effect is that the agent is forced to make at least the minimum pay-out 5 set by the principal. If the minimum payout is higher than the pay-out that would have taken place without control, the direct effect is positive. On the other hand, if the minimum transfer amount is lower, the restriction has no direct effect and it is zero. The indirect effect describes any other reaction of the agent that is not represented by the direct effect. According to Schnedler and Vadovic [Bill I}, HCoC occurs when the indirect effect is negative. On the basis ofthe experiments, Schnedler and 1tradovic {EDI I] came to the following conclusions: In the treatment underlying the experiment, BASELINE, H'CoC are caused. Compared to the BASELINE, both ROBOT and ENDOWMENT cause significantly lower hidden costs, although in both ROBOT and ENDOWMENT the principals control more often than in the BASELINE. All in all, the principal is not in a worse position in any of the results when she controls than when she does not control. Exclusively considering the model of Schnedler and Vadovic [2D] I}, the research question \"Do workers always work harder under control" could thus be answered with a yes, provided that all control had to be perceived as legitimate. 2.3 Criticism of the model The approach of Schnedler and Vadovic {EDI 1) impresses above all with its simple applicability and the associated transferability to similar issues. The predictability of the direct and indirect effect also appears to be of great benefit. However, the model of Schnedler and Vadovic [21111] also has shortcomings. In particular, the lack of transparency in the interpretation ofthe observed transfers is to be criticised. Here, the indirect effect is in the foreground: Although Schnedler and Vadovic (EDI I} try to represent these preference changes, they are ultimately only interpreted into them, since the direct and indirect efTects are not independent of each other. Due to this nonexistent separation, the formulation ofthe effects is impure and greatly simplified. extent to which employees perceive control as legitimate and how this perception inuences compliance with the rules. They conclude that legitimate control based on fairness and independence is an important lever for increasing compliance intentions. Furthermore Bentzen [EDEZ] sees the responsibility of the control question raised by Schnedler and Vadovic {lfll 1] not only in an economic context, but also questions how dysfunctional government systems can be functionalized by means of cocreation. Bengtsson and Engstrm (2W3) apply the model in a further developed, randomized policy experiment to non-prot organisations in Sweden that effectively replaces the trustbased contract with a higher level of monitoring by the client. Based on the ndings of Falk and Kosfeld [EDD-ti} and Schnedler and 1tradovic {EDI l], Reichert and Sohn (Elli?) determine that charitable donations reduce the costs of control. Since control, as also described by Schnedler and Vadovic [2D] 1}, when deemed not legitimate, can be interpreted as a sign of mistrust and thus serves as a trigger for less work done, Reichert and Sohn {2ft 1 9] are looking for another approach to reduce HCoC. They see it in the use of the socalled halo effect, which they obtain through charitable donations. In a laboratory experiment, they confirm the assumption that companies can generate more confidence in their executives through charitable donations. This makes it possible to assess the control costs more positively when a formal control is introduced than without charitable donations. Chadi et al. {2'32 l) are experimenting with the withdrawal of the private smartphone at work and the resulting work performance of employees. They also transfer this to the model ofthe HCoC. Additionally. Wong et al. {2W6} investigated how the \"Social Impact Bond" [SIB]. which aims to reduce belowaverage performance of nonprot organizations by linking private returns from {social} investors to the success of social programs, might develop in a world of rational investors and reliable infomiation. To do this, they use the principal-agent setting as a benchmark. 4 Application and Conclusion The experiment of Schnedler and 'v'adovic clearly shows that the perceived legitimacy of control by employees is important for their success. The supervisor of the HUD is therefore advised to discuss with her employees the legitimacy of control to measure their work in the home ofce and to explain why control is also in the interests of the employees. Abstract The question of whether workers under control work harder than without control is based on several factors. One of these factors is the perceived legitimacy of control by employees. If this condition is met, the Hidden Costs of Control decrease and the Benefits of Control predominate. Schnedler and Vadovic (2011) describe this in their work, which is also considered and discussed in this text. The author proposes further approaches to the research question in order to achieve an interplay of control and incentives for the employees, which could lead to the desired success. All this is done using the practical example of a home office dilemma.2 Legitimacy of Control 2.1 Introduction of the Model and application to HOD Schnedler and Vadovic (2st I) examine in \"Legitimacy of Control" when employee control is tolerated and when it elicits negative reactions. Using an experiment. they show that control is accepted and does not give rise to negative reactions if the control is perceived asjustified by the employees. According to Schnedler and Vadovic [2D] I} this is the case. for example. when control prevents selfishness or theft. In the example of the HUD mentioned above. it could be a question of controlling the movements of the employee's mouse pointer in order to measure the workload. For example. the supervisor might receive a notification if the employee's mouse pointer does not move within a certain period of time and it can be assumed that the employee is not working or not fully working. Due to the shortage of manpower. more work is shifted to all other employees in the same occupation. increasing their workload. In addition, the work of employees often builds on each other. which means that a reduction in the workload can therefore result in other employees lacking the foundation to be able to work themselves. For example. if one employee is not working properly. it is a sign of selfishness. because it only satisfies his own needs and the other employees have to pay by working harder. According to the ndings of Schnedler and 1'vladovic {2'3\"}. the employees in this case would consider the control to be legitimate. since it prevents selfishness and thus serves the majority of the employees