driving along, listening to the car radio and following the rules of the road, when, all of a sudden, a silver sedan comes out re and darts in front of you, causing you to slam on your brakes and spill your chicken nuggets all over the place. did that guy just cut me off?!?!?" Most of us, drivers and observers alike, would tend to attribute his actions to "dispositional s: he's a terrible driver, he likes to scare people on the road, etc. We tend to overlook the possible "situational" factors that n tributing to his recklessness: he's rushing to the hospital, he just spilled his own chicken nuggets and temporarily lost contr r, etc. Psychologists call this tendency to attribute (often incorrectly) others' actions to dispositional factors rather than to onal factors as the fundamental attribution error. interested in seeing if there's a difference in inclination to commit the fundamental attribution error among groups that differ of psychology training. We choose three groups of adults to participate in a study: adults who have no psychology training, ac ave a psychology degree but who are not practicing psychologists, and adults who are practicing psychologists. We show each pant a videotape on which a scenario similar to the one described above was enacted. Then we ask the participants question why the characters in the enactment behaved as they did. We are examining the variables level of psychology training ("no p g", "psych degree, but not a psychologist", and "psychologist") and type(s) of attributions emphasized ("mostly situational", d", and "mostly dispositional"). se that our data are those summarized in the contingency table below. Each cell of the table contains three numbers: the firs er is the observed cell frequency (f ), the second number is the expected cell frequency (f ) under the assumption that the t les level of psychology training and type(s) of attributions emphasized are not associated, and the third number is the followi ( fo - fo ) 2