economics of banking question

(Questions 1-7 relate to the following model) Consider an economy where Banks can invest in one of two projects, G and B. Project G pays 0 if successful and zero if not successful and has a probability of success :rg. Project B pays B if successful and zero if not successful and has a probability of success 3TB. Suppose also that project 0 requires an additional cost of 6. Assume that banks are required to hold an amount of capital k for each unit of investment. Banks are nanced by short term investors who are risk neutral and who require an ex- pected rate oi return equal to the risk tree rate which is zero. Capital is costly because its holders can demand a rate of return of p > 0 and so the profit of a bank is given by either ag(G (1 k)R) c (1 + p)k or 3(3 (1 MR) (1 + p)k depending on what project is invested in Supposethat 6': 8,3 = 14, are =,1r3 = g andc = Mll-l . If k = 0 Le. banks are not required to hold any capital, what is the profit of a bank in equilibrium A. 4.2 B. 4.3 C. 4.6 D. 4.7 E. None otA-D