Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) 110 S.Ct. 1595, 52 Fair Emplprac. Cas. (BNA) 855, 53 Emplprac. Dec. P 39,826... Justice O'Connor filed opinion concurring in judgment, in 110 S. Ct. 1595 which opinion Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun Supreme Court of the United States joined as to Parts I and II only. EMPLOYMENT DIVISION, Justice Blackmun filed dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall join. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF OREGON, et al., Petitioners Opinion on remand, 310 Or. 376, 799 P.2d 148. V . Alfred L. SMITH et al. **1596 Syllabus No. 88-1213. *872 Respondents Smith and Black were fired by a Argued Nov. 6, 1989. private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, for sacramental purposes Decided April 17, 1990. at a ceremony of their Native American Church. Their applications for unemployment compensation were denied by Rehearing Denied June 4, 1990. the State of Oregon under a state law disqualifying employees discharged for work-related "misconduct." Holding that the See 496 U.S. 913, 110 S.Ct. 2605. denials violated respondents' First Amendment free exercise rights, the State Court of Appeals reversed. The State Synopsis Supreme Court affirmed, but this Court vacated the judgment Claimants sought review of determination that their religious and remanded for a determination whether sacramental use of peyote, which resulted in their dismissal from peyote use is proscribed by the State's controlled substance employment, was "misconduct" disqualifying them from law, which makes it a felony to knowingly or intentionally receipt of Oregon unemployment compensation benefits. possess the drug. Pending that determination, the Court In one case, the Oregon Court of Appeals, 75 Or.App. refused to decide whether such use is protected by the 764, 709 P.2d 246, reversed and remanded. The Oregon Constitution. On remand, the State Supreme Court held that Supreme Court, 301 Or. 209, 721 P.2d 445,affirmed as sacramental peyote use violated, and was not excepted from, modified. In the second case, the Oregon Court of Appeals, the state-law prohibition, but concluded that that prohibition 75 Or.App. 735, 707 P.2d 1274, reversed. The Oregon was invalid under the Free Exercise Clause. Supreme Court, 301 Or. 221, 721 P.2d 451, affirmed as modified and remanded. Petition for writ of certiorari was Held: The Free Exercise Clause permits the State to prohibit granted. The Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, 485 U.S. sacramental peyote use and thus to deny unemploymentAmish believer's objection to Social Security taxes from the (1984) ("An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and religious objections that others might have to the collection to petition the government for the redress of grievances could or use of other taxes. "If, for example, a religious adherent not be vigorously protected from interference by the State [if] believes war is a sin, and if a certain percentage of the federal a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those budget can be identified as devoted to war-related activities. ends were not also guaranteed"). such individuals would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that percentage of the income tax. The The present case does not present such a hybrid situation, but tax system could not function if denominations were allowed a free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent activity or parental right. Respondents urge us to hold, in a manner that violates their religious belief." Id., at 260, quite simply, that when otherwise prohibitable conductis accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions but the conduct itself must be ee from governmental regulation. We have never held that, and decline to do so now. There being no contention that Oregon's drug law represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one's children in those beliefs, the rule to which we have adhered ever since Reynolds plainly controls. \"Our cases do not at their farthest reach support the proposition that a stance of conscientious opposition relieves an objector from any colliding duty xed by a democratic government.\" Gillette 1'. United States, supra, 401 U.S., at 461, 91 S.Ct., at 842. B Respondents argue that even though exemption from generally applicable criminal laws need not automatically be extended to religiously motivated actors, at least the claim for a =*883 religious exemption must be evaluated under the balancing test set forth in Sherbert 1'. Perrier; 3'4 US. 398, 33 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 [1963). Under the Siterbert test, governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice must be justied by a compelling governmental interest. See id. at 402403, 83 S.Ct., at 1792 1?94; see also Hernandez 1'. Commissioner: 490 L'.S., at 699, 109 S.Ct., at 2148. Applying that test we have, on three occasions, invalidated state unemployment compensation rules that conditioned the availability of benets upon an applicant's willingness to work under conditions forbidden by his religion. See Sherbert v. Kernel", supra; Thomas 1'. Review Bd. Qflnciiana Employment Seeiit'itt'Ditz, 450 US. 00', 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981);.Hobbie 'l'. Unemployment Appeals Comtn'n off-\"former; 480 US. 136, 10* S.Ct. 1046, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 {1987). We have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbet? test except the denial of unemployment compensation. Although we have sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than that, we have always found the test satised, see provide a Social Security number for their daughter. We held the statute's application to the plaintiffs valid regardless of whether it was necessary to e'ectuate a compelling interest. See 4'6 L'.S., at 699701, 106 S.Ct., at 315153. In Lying 1'. Nottinrest lnciittn Cemeteij' Protective Assn, 485 U.S. 439, 103 S.C'[. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 53.4 (1988), we declined to apply Sherbet? analysis to the Government's logging and road construction activities on lands used for religious purposes by several Native American Tribes, even though it was undisputed that the activities 5,\"'1603 \"could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices,\" 485 15.8., at 451, 108 S.Ct., at 1326. *884 In Goldman 1-: Weinbet'get: 475. L13. 5.03, 106 S.Ct. 13.10, 89 L.Ed.2d 4?3 (1986:}, we rejected application of the Sherberttest to military dress regulations that forbade the wearing of yarmulltes. In 01011:: 1: Estate QfSitobozz, 482 US. 342, 10? S.Ct. 2400, 96 L de 282 (198 T), we sustained, without mentioning the Sherbet? test, a prison's refusal to excuse inmates from work requirements to attend worship services. Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment compensation eld, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law. The Sherbet? test, it must be recalled, was developed in a context that lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct. As a plurality of the Court noted inRo}; a distinctive feature of unemployment compensation programs is that their eligibility criteria invite consideration of the particular circumstances behind an applicant's unemployment: \"The statutory conditions [in Sherbet? and Thomas ] provided that a person was not eligible for unemployment compensation benets if. 'without good cause,' he had quit work or refused available work. The 'good cause= standard created a mechanism for individualized exemptions.\" Bowen 1'. R0}: supra. 476 1.18., at "-08, 106 S.Ct., at 2156 (opinion of Burger, C._T., joined by Powell and REI-JNQUIST, 11.). See also Sitei'bet't. supra, 3?4 1.25., at 401, n. 4, 83 S.Ct., at 1'92, 11. 4 (reading state unemployment compensation law United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d as allowing benefits for unemployment caused by at least 127 (1982); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 91 S.Ct. some "personal reasons"). As the plurality pointed out in 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971). In recent years we have abstained Roy, our decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the from applying the Sherbert test (outside the unemployment proposition that where the State has in place a system of compensation field) at all. In Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693. individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system 106 S.Ct. 2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986), we declined to to cases of "religious hardship" without compelling reason. apply Sherbert analysis to a federal statutory scheme that Bowen v. Roy, supra, 476 U.S., at 708, 106 S.Ct., at 2156-57. required benefit applicants and recipients to provide their Social Security numbers. The plaintiffs in that case asserted Whether or not the decisions are that limited, they at least have that it would violate their religious beliefs to obtain and nothing to do with an across-the-board criminal prohibitionon a particular form of conduct. Although. as noted earlier. we have sometimes used the Sherbert test to analyze free exercise challenges to such laws. see United States 1'. *885 Lee, supra. 455 15.8.. at 252260. 102 S.Ct.. at 1055105"; Gillette 1'. United States. supra. 401 15.8.. at 462. 91 S.Ct.. at 84243. we have never applied the test to invalidate one. We conclude today that the sounder approach. and the approach in accord with the vast majority of our precedents. is to hold the test inapplicable to such challenges. The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct. like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy. L\"cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development.\" Ling, supra; 485 L'.S.. at 451. 108 S.Ct.. at 1326. To make an individuals obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs. except where the State's interest is \"compelling" permitting him. by rtue of his beliefs. \"to become a law unto himself.\" Rer'noiris r. [.'riitea' States. 98 L'.S.. at 16* ' contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense. \"1604 The \"compelling government interest\" requirement seems benign. because it is familiar from other elds. But using it as the standard that must be met before the government may accord different treatment on the basis of race. see. eg, *886 Painiore 1'. Sidati. 466 L15. 429. 432. 104 S.Ct. 1329. 138182. 80 L.Ed.2d 421 [1984). or before the government may regulate the content of speech. see. e.g.. Sabie Communications of C'alii'omia r. F CC. 492 LS. 115. 126. 109 S.Ct. 2829. 2836. 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989}. is not remotely comparable to using it for the purpose asserted here. What it produces in those other eldsequality of treatment and an unrestricted ow of contending speechare constitutional norms; what it would produce herea private right to ignore generally applicable lawsis a constitutional anomaly.3 Nor is it possible to limit the impact of respondents' proposal by requiring a \"compelling state interest\" onlyr when the particular act is \"central\" to his personal faith? Judging the centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable \"business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims." United States 1'. Lee. 455 U.S.. at 263 n. 2. 102 S.Ct.. at 1058 n. 2 (STEVENS. .1. concurring). As we reafrmed only last Term. \"[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith. or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds.\" Hernandez 1'. Commissioner: 490 12.8.. at 699. 109 S.Ct.. at 2148. Repeatedly and in many different contexts. we have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim. See. e. g, Thomas 1: Review Ba'. of Indiana Employment Security Dirt, 450 12.8.. at 216. 101 S.Ct.. at 1431. Presbyterian Church in [5.3. 1: Mary Elizabeth \"1605 BirteHaii Surenroriai Presbyterian Church. 393 vs. at 450. 89 S.Ct.. at 606OT; Jones 1-. nan: 443 us. 595. 602606. 99 S.Ct. 3020. 30243021 61 L.Ed.2d 7"?5 (19'9); United States 1'. Ballard, 322 12.8. TS. 8532. 64 S.Ct. 882. 8858". 88 L.Ed. 11-18(1'27144).JI *838 If the \"compelling interest" test is to be applied at all. then. it must be applied across the board. to all actions thought to be religiously commanded. Moreover. if \"compelling interest" really means what it says (and watering it down here would subvert its rigor in the other elds where it is applied). many laws will not meet the test. Any society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy. but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs. and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them. Precisely because \"we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious preference." Bratrny'iaiaT 1'. Brown. 366 12.8.. at 606. 81 S.Ct.. at 114'. and precisely because we value and protect that religious divergence. we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptirei}: im'alid, as applied to the religious objector. every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order. The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions conduct prohibited is "central" to the individual's religion. from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind- Cf. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 ranging from *889 compulsory military service, see, e.g., U.S., at 474-476, 108 S.Ct., at 1338-1339 (BRENNAN, J., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 91 S.Ct. 828, 28 dissenting). It is no #887 more appropriate for judges to L.Ed.2d 168 (1971), to the payment of taxes, see, e.g., United determine the "centrality" of religious beliefs before applying States v. Lee, supra; to health and safety regulation such as a "compelling interest" test in the free exercise field, than manslaughter and child neglect laws, see, e.g., Funkhouser it would be for them to determine the "importance" of v. State, 763 P.2d 695 (Okla. Crim.App.1988), compulsory ideas before applying the "compelling interest" test in the vaccination laws, see. e.g., Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, free speech field. What principle of law or logic can be 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964). drug laws, see, e.g., Olsen v. Drug brought to bear to contradict a believer's assertion that a Enforcement Administration, 279 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 878 F.2d1458 (1989), and traffic laws, see Cox v. New Hampshire, their dismissal results from use of the drug. The decision of 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941); to social the Oregon Supreme Court is accordingly reversed. welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws, see Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. It is so ordered. 290, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985), child labor laws, see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944), animal cruelty laws, see, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Ave Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F.Supp. 1467 (SD Fla.1989), cf. State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179, appeal dism'd, 336 U.S. 942, 69 S.Ct. 813, 93 L.Ed. 1099 (1949), environmental protection laws, **1606 see United States v. Little, 638 F.Supp. 337 (Mont. 1986), and laws providing for equality of opportunity for the races, see. e.g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-604, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2034-2035, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983). The First Amendment's protection of religious liberty does not require this. *890 Values that are protected against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process. Just as a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to the press by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that affirmatively foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well. It is therefore not surprising that a number of States have made an exception to their drug laws for sacramental peyote use. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev.Stat.Ann. $$ 13-3402(B)(1)-(3) (1989); Colo.Rev.Stat. $ 12-22-317(3) (1985); N.M.Stat.Ann. $ 30-31-6(D) (Supp. 1989). But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequenceof democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a lav: unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs. J'IH'ICIII Because respondents' ingestion of peyote \"m prohibited under Oregon law, and because that prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, den}.r respondents unemployment compensation when 660, 108 S.Ct. 1444, 99 L.Ed.2d 753, vacated judgment benefits to persons discharged for such use. Pp. 1598-1606. and remanded for determination whether sacramental peyote use was proscribed by state's controlled substance law. On (a) Although a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise remand, the Oregon Supreme Court, 307 Or. 68, 763 P.2d 146. [of religion]" in violation of the Clause if it sought to ban held that sacramental peyote use violated state drug laws, but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts solely concluded that prohibition was nonetheless invalid under free because of their religious motivation, the Clause does not exercise clause. The Supreme Court, Scalia, J., held that: (1) relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a free exercise clause did not prohibit application of Oregon law that incidentally forbids (or requires) the performance drug laws to ceremonial ingestion of peyote, and (2) thus state of an act that his religious belief requires (or forbids) if could, consistent with free exercise clause, deny claimants the law is not specifically directed to religious practice unemployment compensation for work-related misconduct and is otherwise constitutional as applied to those who based on use of drug. engage in the specified act for nonreligious reasons. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-167, 25 Reversed. L.Ed. 244. The only decisions in which this Court has held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral.generally applicable law to religiously motivated action are Linder, Solicitor General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Assistant distinguished **1597 on the ground that they involved Solicitor General. not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but that Clause in conjunction with other constitutionalprotections. *873 See, Craig J. Dorsay argued the cause and filed briefs for e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-307, 60 S.Ct. respondents.* 900, 903-905, 84 L.Ed. 1213; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. * Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15. Pp. 1598-1602. American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Steven R. Shapiro (b) Respondents' claim for a religious exemption from the and John A. Powell; for the American Jewish Congress by Oregon law cannot be evaluated under the balancing test Amy Adelson, Lois C. Waldman, and Marc D. Stern; for the set forth in the line of cases following Sherbert v. Verner, Association on American Indian Affairs et al. by Steven C. 374 U.S. 398, 402-403, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1792-1794, 10 Moore and Jack Trope; and for the Council on Religious L.Ed.2d 965, whereby governmental actions that substantially Freedom by Lee Boothby and Robert W. Nixon. burden a religious practice must be justified by a "compelling Opinion governmental interest." That test was developed in a context -unemployment compensation eligibility rules-that lent *874 Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct. The test is inapplicable This case requires us to decide whether the Free Exercise to an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular Clause of the First Amendment permits the State of Oregon form of conduct. A holding to the contrary would create an to include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of extraordinary right to ignore generally applicable laws that its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug, and thus are not supported by "compelling governmental interest" on permits the State to deny unemployment benefits to persons the basis of religious belief. Nor could such a right be limited dismissed from their jobs because of such religiously inspired to situations in which the conduct prohibited is "central" to use. the individual's religion, since that would enmesh judges in an impermissible inquiry into the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith. Cf. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 H U.S. 680, 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 2148-2149, 104 L.Ed.2d 766. Thus, although it is constitutionally permissible to exempt Oregon law prohibits the knowing or intentional possession sacramental peyote use from the operation of drug laws, it is of a "controlled substance" unless the substance has not constitutionally required. Pp. 1602-1606. been prescribed by a medical practitioner. Ore.Rev.Stat. $ 475.992(4) (1987). The law defines "controlled substance" 307 Or. 68, 763 P.2d 146, reversed. as a drug classified in Schedules I through V of the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. $$ 811-812, SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in as modified by the State Board of Pharmacy. Ore.Rev.Stat. which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, STEVENS, and $ 475.005(6) (1987). Persons who violate this provision by KENNEDY, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion possessing a controlled substance listed on Schedule I are concurring in the judgment, in Parts I and II of which "guilty of a Class B felony." $ 475.992(4)(a). As compiled BRENNAN. MARSHALL, and BLACK joined by the State Board of Pharmacy under its statutory authority,without concurring in the judgment, post, p. 1606. see, $ 475.035, Schedule I contains the drug peyote, a BLACKMUN. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which hallucinogen derived from the plant Lophophora williamsii BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 1615. Lemaire. Ore.Admin.Rule 855-80-021(3)(s) (1988). Respondents Alfred Smith and Galen Black (hereinafter Attorneys and Law Firms respondents) were fired from their jobs with a private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote for Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon, argued the sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were James Church, of which **1598 both are members. When E. Mountain, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Virginia L. respondents applied to petitioner Employment Division(hereinafter petitioner) for unemployment compensation, they were determined to be ineligible for benefits because On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that respondents' they had been discharged for work-related "misconduct." The religiously inspired use of peyote fell within the prohibition Oregon Court of Appeals reversed that determination, holding of the Oregon statute, which "makes no exception for the that the denial of benefits violated respondents' free exercise sacramental use" of the drug. 307 Or. 68, 72-73, 763 P.2d rights under the First Amendment. 146, 148 (1988). It then considered whether that prohibition was valid under the Free Exercise Clause, and concluded *875 On appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court, petitioner that it was not. The court therefore reaffirmed its previous argued that the denial of benefits was permissible because ruling that the State could not deny unemployment benefits to respondents' consumption of peyote was a crime under respondents for having engaged in that practice. Oregon law. The Oregon Supreme Court reasoned, however, that the criminality of respondents' peyote use was irrelevant We again granted certiorari. 489 U.S. 1077, 109 S.Ct. 1526, to resolution of their constitutional claim-since the purpose 103 L.Ed.2d 832 (1989). of the "misconduct" provision under which respondents had been disqualified was not to enforce the State's criminal laws but to preserve the financial integrity of the compensation II fund, and since that purpose was inadequate to justify the burden that disqualification imposed on respondents' Respondents' claim for relief rests on our decisions in religious practice. Citing our decisions in Sherbert v. Verner, Sherbert v. Verner, supra, Thomas v. Review Bd. of 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), and Indiana Employment Security Div., supra, and Hobbie v. Thomas v. Review Bd., Indiana Employment Security Div., Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981), the 107 S.Ct. 1046, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987), in which we held that court concluded that respondents were entitled to payment of a State could not condition the availability of unemployment unemployment benefits. Smith v. Employment Div., Dept. of insurance on an individual's willingness to forgo conduct Human Resources, 301 Or. 209, 217-219, 721 P.2d 445, 449- required by his religion. As we observed in Smith I, however, 450 (1986). We granted certiorari. 480 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. the conduct at issue in those cases was not prohibited by 1368, 94 L.Ed.2d 684 (1987) law. We held that distinction to be critical, for "if Oregon does prohibit the religious **1599 use of peyote, and if that Before this Court in 1987, petitioner continued to maintain prohibition is consistent with the Federal Constitution, there that the illegality of respondents' peyote consumption was is no federal right to engage in that conduct in Oregon," and relevant to their constitutional claim. We agreed, concluding "the State is free to withhold unemployment compensation that "if a State has prohibited through its criminal laws certain from respondents for engaging in work-related misconduct, kinds of religiously motivated conduct without violating the despite its religious motivation." 485 U.S., at 672, 108 S.Ct., First Amendment, it certainly follows that it may impose at 1451. Now that the Oregon Supreme Court has confirmed the lesser burden of denying unemployment compensation that Oregon does prohibit the religious use of peyote, we benefits to persons who engage in that conduct." Employment proceed to consider whether that prohibition is permissible Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 485 U.S. under the Free Exercise Clause. 660, 670, 108 S.Ct. 1444, 1450, 99 L.Ed.2d 753 (1988) (Smith I ). We noted, however, that the Oregon Supreme Court hadnot decided whether respondents sacramental use of peyote was in fact proscribed by Oregon's controlled substance law: and that this issue was a matter of dispute between the parties. Being \"uncertain about the legality of the religious use of peyote in Oregon,\" we determined that it would not be \"appropriate for us to decide whether the practice is protected by the Federal Constitution.\" Int. at 673. 108 S.Ct._. at 1452. Accordingly: we *876 vacated the judent of the Oregon Supreme Court and remanded for further proceedings. lot. at 674,108 S.Ct., at 1452. A The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. which has been made applicable to the States by incorporation into i'87"! the Fourteenth Amendment. see Cmmrefi 1'. Connecticut. 310 US. 296, 303. 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 34 L.Ed. 1213 (1940}, provides that \"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. or prohibiting the ee erereise thereof... \" US. Const. Arndt. l (emphasis added.) The free exercise of religion means, rst and foremost. the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine religious belief forbids (or requires). As a textual matter, we one desires. Thus, the First Amendment obviously excludes do not think the words must be given that meaning. It is no all "governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such." more necessary to regard the collection of a general tax, for Sherbert v. Verner, supra, 374 U.S., at 402, 83 S.Ct., at 1793. example, as "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" by The government may not compel affirmation of religious those citizens who believe support of organized government belief, see Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct. 1680, to be sinful, than it is to regard the same tax as "abridging 6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961), punish the expression of religious the freedom ... of the press" of *#1600 those publishing doctrines it believes to be false, United States v. Ballard, 322 companies that must pay the tax as a condition of staying in U.S. 78, 86-88, 64 S.Ct. 882, 886-87, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944), business. It is a permissible reading of the text, in the one case impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views as in the other, to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion or religious status, see McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 98 (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object of the S.Ct. 1322, 55 L.Ed.2d 593 (1978); Fowler v. Rhode Island, tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable 345 U.S. 67, 69, 73 S.Ct. 526, 527, 97 L.Ed. 828 (1953); cf. and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 1683- been offended. Compare Citizen Publishing Co. v. United 84, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982), or lend its power to one or the States, 394 U.S. 131, 139, 89 S.Ct. 927, 931-32, 22 L.Ed.2d other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma, 148 (1969) (upholding application of antitrust laws to press), see Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull with Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250-251, Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445 452, 89 56 S.Ct. 444, 449, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936) (striking down license S.Ct. 601, 604-608, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969); Kedroff v. St. tax applied only to newspapers with weekly circulation above Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 95-119, 73 S.Ct. 143, 143- a specified level); see generally Minneapolis Star & Tribune 56, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581, 103 v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-725, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2380- S.Ct. 1365, 1369-70, 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983). 2388, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976). Our decisions reveal that the latter reading is the correct But the "exercise of religion" often involves not only one. We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention #879 excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid from) physical acts: assembling with others for a worship law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, On the contrary, the record of more than a century of our proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or certain modes free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition. As of transportation. It would be true, we think (though no described succinctly by Justice Frankfurter in Minersville case of ours has involved the point), that a State would be School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594- "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" if it sought to 595, 60 S.Ct. 1010, 1012-1013, 84 L.Ed. 1375 (1940): ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in "Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from that they display. It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion example, to ban the casting of "statues that are to be used or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of *878 for worship purposes," or to prohibit bowing down religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns before a golden calf. of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities (footnote omitted)."Respondents in the present case, however, seek to carry the We first had occasion to assert that principle in Reynolds meaning of "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" one v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878), where large step further. They contend that their religious motivation we rejected the claim that criminal laws against polygamy for using peyote places them beyond the reach of a criminal could not be constitutionally applied to those whose religion law that is not specifically directed at their religious practice, commanded the practice. "Laws." we said. "are made for the and that is concededly constitutional as applied to those who government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with use the drug for other reasons. They assert, in other words. mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.... that "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" includes Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of requiring any individual to observe a generally applicable law his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the that requires (or forbids) the performance of an act that his professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law ofthe land, and in eect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.\" id. at 166167. Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a \"valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribesyT United States 1'. Lee, 455 US. 252, 263, n, 3, 102 S.Ct.1051, 1058, n. 3, .'1 L.Ed.2d12?(1982}(STE\\.-"ENS, J., concurring injudgment); see Minersviiie Schooi Dist. Sci. of Ed. 1'. Gohitis. supra. 310 US, at 595, 60 S.Ct., at 1013 (collecting cases). In Prince 1'. Jrfossochnsetts. 321 US. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944), we held that a mother could be prosecuted under the child labor laws *880 for using her children to dispense literature in the streets, her religious motivation notwithstanding. We found no constitutional inrmity in \"excluding [these children] from doing there what no other children may do." Id. at 121, 64 S.Ct., at 444. In Bi'oiittfeid 1'. Brown, 366 US. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 {1961) (plurality opinion), we upheld Sunday-closing laws against the claim that they burdened the religious practices of persons whose religions compelled them to re'ain from work on other days. In Giiiette 1'. iL'niteor Stores, 401 US. 437, 461, 91 S.Ct. 828, 842, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 [1971}, we sustained the military Selective Service System against the claim that it violated ee exercise by conscripting persons who opposed a particular war on religious grounds. \"1601 Our most recent decision involving a neutral, generally applicable regulatory law that compelled activity forbidden by an individual's religion was United States 1'. Lee. 455 vs, at 258261, 102 s.c1., at 10551057. There, an Amish employer, on behalf of himself and his employees, sought exemption from collection and payment of Social Security taxes on the ground that the Amish faith prohibited participation in governmental support programs. We rejected the claim that an exuption was constitutionally required. There would be no way, we observed, to distinguish the 102 S.Ct., at 105657. Cf. Hernandez 1'. Connnissionet: 490 us. 680, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1939) (rejecting 'ee exercise challenge to payment of income taxes alleged to make religious activities more di'lcult). *881 The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as 'eedom of speech and of the press, see Contu'eii 1'. Connecticut. 310 13.8., at 304302, 60 S.Ct., at 903905 (invalidating a licensing system for religious and charitable solicitations under which the administrator had discretion to deny a license to any cause he deemed nonreligiousj; Jti'docit 1'. Pennsrtronio. 319 US. 105, 63 S.Ct. 810, 87 L.Ed, 1292 (1943) (invalidating a at tax on solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas); Foiiett 1'. McCormick. 321 15.5. 523, 64 S.Ct. 21?, 88 L.Ed. 938 (1944} (same), or the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce 1'. Society of Sisters, 268 15.8. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925), to direct the education of their children, see Hisconsin 1'. Yoder. 406 Us. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (invalidating compulsory school- attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school).1 *882 Some of our cases prohibiting compelled expression, decided exclusively upon free speech mounds, have also involved 'eedom of religion, cf. Whoiey 1'. Mm'noi'd. 430 LTS. '05, 9'- S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 7'52 (19??) (invalidating compelled display of a license plate slogan that offended individual religious beliefs); West Virginia Bet. of Education 1'. Benzene. 319 US. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1128, 8? L.Ed. 1628 (1943') (invalidating in"1602 compulsory ag salute statute challenged by religious objectors). And it is easy to envision a case in which a challenge on freedom of association grounds would likewise be reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns. Cf.' Roberts 1'. United States Jtn'cees, 468 US. 609, 622, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 325152, 82 L.Ed.2d 462