Exercice 4:

Three friends (Julie, Kristin and Larissa) independently go shopping for dresses for their high-school prom. On reaching the store, each girl sees only three dresses worth considering: one black, one lavender, and one yellow. Each girl, furthermore, knows that her two friends would consider the same set of three dresses because all three have somewhat similar tastes. Each girl would prefer to have a unique dress, so each girl's payoff is 0 if she ends up purchasing the same dress as at least one of her friends. All threeknow that Julie strongly prefers black to both lavender and yellow, so she would get a payoff of 3 if she were the only one wearing the black dress, and a payoff of 1 if she were either the only one wearing the lavender dress or the only one wearing the yellow dress. Similarly, all know that Kristin prefers lavender and secondarily prefers yellow, so her payoff would be 3 for uniquely wearing lavender, 2 for uniquely wearing yellow, and 1 for uniquely wearing black. Finally, all know that Larissa prefers yellow and secondarily prefers black, so she would get 3 for uniquely wearing yellow, 2 for uniquely wearing black, and 1 for uniquely wearing lavender.

(a)Provide the game table for this three-player game. Make Julie the row player, Kristin the column player and Larissa the page player.

(b)Identify any dominated strategies in this game, or explain why there are none.

(c)What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this game?