Exercise 2. Voting (6 points) Voters in Suburbia are choosing between two candidates, L and R. L is proposing new infras- tructure funded with new taxes. Candidate R is in favour of preserving the status quo, i.e., no new taxes and no new spending. Consider three voters - Alison, Beth, and Chandra - whose preferences and payoff are as follows. a Alison's payoff is 2 if L wins but 0 otherwise. a Beth's payoff is 2 if R wins but 0 otherwise. 0 Chandra is not interested in electoral politics. Nonetheless voting is compulsory in Suburbia so he always votes. He gets 0 if the candidate he votes for wins. Otherwise, his payoff is -1. All three individuals Alison, Beth, and Chandra - vote. Candidates receiving majority of the votes wins. (i) (2 points) Write down the 3person normal form game where Alison, Beth, and Chan- dra are three players and each of them has two strategies - vote for L or vote for R. As described above, their payoffs depend on the outcome of the election. (ii) (2 points) Find out all Nash equilibria in pure strategies. (iii) (2 points) Suppose we are interested in Nash equilibria where neither strictly nor weakly dominated strategies are played. A Nash equilibrium satisfying this property is called admissible. Are all Nash equilibria in (ii) admissible