Imagine a duopoly of two telecommunications providers, BigCom and SuperTeL At a secret meeting between the executives of the o companies, they discuss ways of increasing their profits BigCom executives say that they prefer a strategy of increasing prices to customers, whereas SuperTeI executives say that they prefer a strategy of cutting advertising costs. With respect to the following pay-off matrix (the numbers represent millions of dollars in extra profit): BigCom Cut advertising prices cut advertising Super Tel Raise pn ces 50, 20 20, 50 O a There are two Nash equilibria in this game: BigCom and SuperTel both cut advertising, or both raise prices. O There are no Nash equilibria in this game. O SuperTel's dominant strategy is to cut advertising and BigCom's dominant strategy is to raise prices. O The single Nash equilibrium in this game is for both BigCom and SuperTel to cut advertising. O e It would be better for both BigCom and SuperTel if they each followed their originally preferred strategies independently. O f' There is no rational explanation of what would happen in this game.