in Australia and New Zealand. I nstead of their earnings' coming from their individual catches, they get a share of the revenue Of the industry as a whole. This has lead to an in profits t*cause it gies the individual less incentive to fish, increasing strx:ks. , when the fishermen venture out they do not have to as far to find fish, Iouering their Higher prices for the fish. and Jowvr ing translate into higher profits. fish in the (Rean and hig'wr profits for fishermanit :erns to a clear pareto improvement. Cartels usually 1k nefit producersand yet they usually break down, for a reason. Here, profits are up. but revenues are down. This suggests an incentive to cheat. the cartel works and the fish supply reixuns_ Meanwhile, the price Of has risen The fisherman can fish to home, facing the Iouer osts. but has ewry incentive to sell some of his catch for a slightly kmer price (even if he has to QI his catch on the black market), increasing his profits further. Only a matter of time t*fore the cartel breaks down. Commercial fishing can extremely dangerous. but also lucrative. If you take away thc large upside of risking your life for an exceptional catch, incentive do the fishermen have? Further, quite a bit of fishing crcurs in international waters. There exists a rather contentious relationship Alaskan and Canadian fisherman in pacific North"Bt, cu4kration twt"een them is unlikely and if only country colludes will the fishing stxk still r&und? Still, if these inherent can an interesting policy presents itself. If overprtAiuction of the in question has negatiw externalities, imvxsing a cartel provide an alternative to credits or taxation?