\fafterwards suing to recover the money back. COUNSEL: Hon. Richard F. Knight, for Plaintiff Appellant, Bruce E. Bickham. Hon. Dale E. Branch, for Defendant/ Appellee. JUDGES: G. L. Covington CJ., Savoie and LeBlanc, JJ. OPINION BY: COVINGTON OPINION [*457] Plaintiff appeals the judgment which awarded him $ 840.50 plus interest and costs, but rejected all other demands against the defendants for interest paid by plaintiff on certain loans that was in excess of previously agreed-upon rates. In view of the Supreme Court's holding in New Orleans & NE.R. Co. v. Louisiana Const. & Imp. Co., 109 La. 13, 33 So. 51 (1902), to the effect that Louisiana law does not permit a party to recover voluntary [*458] payments merely because payment was made under protest, ' we affirm the judgment of the trial court and adopt the Reasons for Judgment of the trial judge as our own and attach a copy hereto as Appendix A. 1 Former Article 1856 of the Civil Code provided as follows: If the violence used be only a legal constraint, or the threats only of doing that which the party using them had a right to do, they shall not invalidate the contract. A just and legal imprisonment, or threats of any measure authorized by law and by the circumstances of the case, are of this description This article was amended and reenacted by Acts 1984, No. 331, eff. Jan 1, 1985; however, there was no substantive change in the law. Therefore, the long line of jurisprudence holding that a threat to exercise a legal right or institute civil suit is not "duress" continues to be applicable to these situations and is now codified in Article 1962. Thus a payment in response to this type of "threat" neither constitutes a vice of consent nor qualifies such payment as a thing not due under Civil Code Articles 2301 er sag. [**2] Costs of the appeal are to be bome by the appellant. All other costs are to be fixed as decreed in the trial court's judgment. AFFIRMED. APPENDIX A BRUCE B. BICKHAM and BICKHAM, INCORPORATED VERSUS WASHINGTON BANK & TRUST CO. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT On January 23, 1974, Bruce Bickham and G. S. Adams, Jr., Vice-President of the Washington Bank & Trust Co., met and struck an agreement for Bickham to do his personal and corporate banking business with the Washington Bank & Trust Co. The specifics of the agreement were summarized the following day in a letter from Mr. Adams to Mr. Bickham: (1) Effective January 24, 1974, Bickham's demand deposit accounts would not be charged a service charge; (2) The Bank would loan Bickham and his corporations a maximum of $ 500,000.00; (3) The Bank would lend the money at an interest rate of 7-1/2 % per annum;\fThe Court in New Orleans & N.E.R. Co., supra, 109 La. 13, 22, lists circumstances in which payments are not voluntary payments, including "where the parties are not on equal terms, where the payer had no choice, where the only alternative was to submit to an illegal exaction or discontinuance of business or like circumstances." [*460] However, the Court continues by saying "but where dispute arises and the debtor, who pays under protest, has at hand other means of immediate relief than by making payment, his act is not done under coercion, and his protest does not take the case out of the category of voluntary payments." The Court concludes by stating that if one has the opportunity to test the legality of a demand, he must do so at the time of the demand. Bickham should have sought judicial relief before paying the excess interest. The Court [* *8] was available, and a petition by Bickham seeking a declaratory judgment would have resulted in a prompt judicial disposition of the issues. He did not do so, and is now precluded from recovering the overcharge. The Supreme Court, in New Orleans and N.E.R. Co. v. Louisiana Construction and Improvement Company, supra, while referring to other cases, made several quotes that are pertinent to this case: "The court deem this a plain case. It is an established rule of law that if a party, with a full knowledge of the facts, voluntarily pays a demand unjustly made on him and attempted to be enforced by legal proceedings, he cannot recover back the money, as paid by compulsion, unless there be fraud in the party enforcing the claim and a knowledge that the claim is unjust. And the case is not altered by the fact that the party, so paying, protests that he is not answerable and gives notice that he will bring an action to recover the money back. He has an opportunity, in the first instance, to c to contest the claim at law. He has, or may have, a day in court; he may plead and make proof that the claim on him is such as he is not bound to pay. * * * The party has an option whether to [* *9] litigate the question, or submit to the demand and pay the money." 'There is no principle of law better settled then that money voluntarily paid with a knowledge of the facts cannot be recovered back. * * If, in every instance in which a man is in doubt as to which is the safe course to pursue, he can pay under protest and then sue to recover back, it is difficult to see where litigation is to end. The law, therefore, wisely holds that a voluntary payment cannot be recovered back." In Mays v. City of Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268 (1982), it was said: - "The reason of the rule and its propriety ar quite obvious when applied to a case of payment upon a mere demand of money unaccompanied with any power or a rity to enforce such demand, except by suit at law. In such case, if the party would resist an unjust demand, he must do so at the threshold. The parties treat with each other upon equal terms, and if litigation is intended by the party of whom the money is demanded, it should precede payment. * * * When he [ the debtor] can only be reached by a proceeding at law, he is bound to make his defense in the first instance, and one the litigation [* *10] by paying the demand in silence and afterwards suing to recover back" However, as to the indebtedness occurred on February 16, 1974, that still has a current balance, plaintiff is obligated to pay only 7-1/2 % interest from the date of the filing of this suit until maturity, and the Washington Bank & Trust Co. is to pay over to plaintiff any overcharge he has paid on this loan since the filing of this suit, together with legal interest thereon from date of judicial demand until paid, and for all costs of these proceedings. Judgment in accordance with these reasons will be signed when submitted. Franklinton, Louisiana, this 18th day of March, 1986. A. Clayton James - DISTRICT JUDGE