Fall 2013 Suppose that the size of the potential price cut is p = 5 in parts (a)(i) below. (a) (b) (0) (d) (e) (f) (g) (11) Does this signaling game have any separating perfect Bayesian equilibria? If it does, nd them. If it does not, explain why the types cannot separate in equilibrium. Is there a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which Established Air pools on slashing prices? Find one, or show that no such equilibrium exists. If you found an equilibrium in part (b), does it pass the intuitive criterion? Be sure to justify your answer. Is there a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which Established Air pools on maintaining prices? Find one, or show that no such equilibrium exists. If you found an equilibrium in part ((1), does it pass the intuitive criterion? Be sure to justify your answer. Find all (pure-strategy) perfect Bayesian equilibria in which Established Air pools on maintaining prices. Do any of these pass the intuitive criterion? If so, which do? If not, explain Why none do. Until now you have taken p to be xed at 5. Find the range of possible values of p for which a separating equilibrium exists and give an intuitive explanation for this range