Fatima organizes a private value auction where she will auction an object. She only knows that five bidders will participate in the auction. Fatima does not know the valuations of these five bidders but does know that their valuations are independent and uniformly distributed in the range [0,240]. All five bidders are risk neutral and do not suffer from any behavioral biases. a) What is Fatima's ex-ante expected revenue if she chooses a Dutch auction as the auction format? How much is Fatima's ex-ante expected revenue if she chooses to auction the object in an second-price sealed bid auction? NB: calculate and explain your answer for both auction formats. Hanna is one of the five bidders at the above mentioned auction. Her valuation of the auctioned object is 180 . Hanna doesn't know the other bidders' valuations but does know that their valuations are uniformly distributed. b) How much will Hanna bid in the second-price sealed bid auction? How much will she bid in the Dutch auction? [Hint: Hanna will assume that her own valuation of 180 is the highest.] Intermediate Microeconomics, Games and Behaviour ECB2VMIE 2022-2023 c) Right before the start of the auction Hanna finds herself suddenly suffering from loser regret as is described in Dodonova, A, \& Y. Khoroshilov (2009), Behavioural biases in auctions: an experimental study. Will Hanna change her bid in the Dutch auction? Explain your answer. Fatima organizes a private value auction where she will auction an object. She only knows that five bidders will participate in the auction. Fatima does not know the valuations of these five bidders but does know that their valuations are independent and uniformly distributed in the range [0,240]. All five bidders are risk neutral and do not suffer from any behavioral biases. a) What is Fatima's ex-ante expected revenue if she chooses a Dutch auction as the auction format? How much is Fatima's ex-ante expected revenue if she chooses to auction the object in an second-price sealed bid auction? NB: calculate and explain your answer for both auction formats. Hanna is one of the five bidders at the above mentioned auction. Her valuation of the auctioned object is 180 . Hanna doesn't know the other bidders' valuations but does know that their valuations are uniformly distributed. b) How much will Hanna bid in the second-price sealed bid auction? How much will she bid in the Dutch auction? [Hint: Hanna will assume that her own valuation of 180 is the highest.] Intermediate Microeconomics, Games and Behaviour ECB2VMIE 2022-2023 c) Right before the start of the auction Hanna finds herself suddenly suffering from loser regret as is described in Dodonova, A, \& Y. Khoroshilov (2009), Behavioural biases in auctions: an experimental study. Will Hanna change her bid in the Dutch auction? Explain your