Feel struggled about the following question, it is about the Game Theory and Nash Equilibrium:

Consider the lfollowing simultaneous- -moye game between players A and B where 1: E R,y E R, z E R are some parameters. (a) Find conditions on I, y and 2 so that the strategy prole (U, I} is a Nash equilibrium. (b) Find conditions on 3,1; and 2 so that strategy U is strictly dominated. (c) Find conditions on 3,11; and 2 so that, for some ,3 E (0,1), a proper mixed strategy (13,1 f3} of player B (i.e., B plays I with probability ,3 and r with probability (1 13)} is the best response to some strategy of player A (formally: there exists 13 E (0,1) and a mixed strategy of player A such that (,8, 1 ,8) is the best response to that strategy). (d) [5pt] Give an example of values 3,11; and z and a mixed strategy (or, 1 or) of player 1 such that player B's best response is to play i and r with equal probabilities