Ff, answer the followi

1. Human Capital in the SolowSwan Model: Suppose that the production function in the BelowSwan model is given by ya) = AK{t)QH(t)AL[t)1_'1_A where Y is output1 A is technology, K is physical capital, H is human capital, and L is labour. Assume that U 5 a g 1, 0 E A 5 1,0: + A 0. Output can be converted onetoone into either investment in physical capital or human capital. Saving directed towards investment into physical capital is given by D 0 if at least & other hunters also choose Stag and gets 0 otherwise. The possible values for # is [a, b] where a v. (a) Assume that # is known and compute the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria. (b) Assume that @ is not known. Each player i observes a signal Ii = 0 + En where 0