fidential. Please not distribute. not distribute. Confidential Confidential. Please d& ase do not dist? each of which has a total cost cost of 4 and that market demand (C) I distrlarket, What is the market price? What is its optimal output? Consider the following dowhere x > 0: is the Nash equilibrium (or eng 140) Condo los ase do not distribute What is the Nash equilibrium (or equilibria Ple or Q2 (DOMINANT FIRM MODEL.] Apple's iPod has been the portal MP3-player of choice among many gadget enthusi- asts. Suppose that Apple has a constant is given by Q = 200 2P. Suppose there competitive of 12 price-taking TC(q) = 32 (a) Find the supply function of the fringe. (b) If Apple operates as the dominant firm facing competition from the fringe in this many units will fringe providers sell? Q3 (MIXED STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM] Firm 2 High Price Low Price Firm 1 Price (20, 160) Price 90-x) (50, 50) (a) (3 marks) For what values of x firms have a dominant strategy? What in these (b) (3 marks) For what values of x does only have a dominant strategy? in these cases? (c) marks) Let x = 30. Is there a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in this game? what is it? Confidential. Please do not distribute jal. Please do not distribute. tribute. .Contid Confidential. Please do Confidential. I distribute LO If so, ribute Please ute. fidential. Please not distribute. not distribute. Confidential Confidential. Please d& ase do not dist? each of which has a total cost cost of 4 and that market demand (C) I distrlarket, What is the market price? What is its optimal output? Consider the following dowhere x > 0: is the Nash equilibrium (or eng 140) Condo los ase do not distribute What is the Nash equilibrium (or equilibria Ple or Q2 (DOMINANT FIRM MODEL.] Apple's iPod has been the portal MP3-player of choice among many gadget enthusi- asts. Suppose that Apple has a constant is given by Q = 200 2P. Suppose there competitive of 12 price-taking TC(q) = 32 (a) Find the supply function of the fringe. (b) If Apple operates as the dominant firm facing competition from the fringe in this many units will fringe providers sell? Q3 (MIXED STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM] Firm 2 High Price Low Price Firm 1 Price (20, 160) Price 90-x) (50, 50) (a) (3 marks) For what values of x firms have a dominant strategy? What in these (b) (3 marks) For what values of x does only have a dominant strategy? in these cases? (c) marks) Let x = 30. Is there a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in this game? what is it? Confidential. Please do not distribute jal. Please do not distribute. tribute. .Contid Confidential. Please do Confidential. I distribute LO If so, ribute Please ute
