Find all pure and mixed Nash equilibria of the following games . Game 1 Player2 Player 5 1 8' Game 2 Player2 Game 3 Player2 a b 1 b-- 2 Two field generals, 1 and 2, are positioned to attack an enemy stronghold in the valley below. The two armies are separated by a treacherous canyon and communication between the two commanders is impossible . The generals know that if they coordinate their attack 7 both moving their troops into the valley at dawn, they will defeat the enemy, earning a value v. If one of the two sides attacks alone , the other will not be able to re ~enforce the attacker's troops in time to prevent a defeat at the enemy's hands , losing '0. Suppose all these elements of the strategic problem are com mon knowledge. 1. (5 pts) Solve for the (plne and mixed strategy )Nash equilibria 2. (5 pts) Consider a modied version of this game . Suppose that General 1 must rst decide whether or not to attack 1 and then General 2 decides whether or not to attack based upon General 1's decision ' Solve for the (pure) Nash equilibria and the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria