Finite Horizon: Sustaining Cooperation Consider the following game under normal form (Player 1 picks row and Player 2 picks column). (a) Give the set of Nash Equilibria in pure strategies. (b) Consider that the game is played twice (and that payoffs are not discounted). Assume that players observe what has been played in period 1 before moving on to period 2 . Find a SPNE such that both players have a total payoff equal to 7. (c) Consider that the game is played three times (and that payoffs are not discounted). Assume that players observe what has been played in period t before moving on to period t+1 for t=1,2. Find a SPNE such that both players have a total payoff equal to 11 . Finite Horizon: Sustaining Cooperation Consider the following game under normal form (Player 1 picks row and Player 2 picks column). (a) Give the set of Nash Equilibria in pure strategies. (b) Consider that the game is played twice (and that payoffs are not discounted). Assume that players observe what has been played in period 1 before moving on to period 2 . Find a SPNE such that both players have a total payoff equal to 7. (c) Consider that the game is played three times (and that payoffs are not discounted). Assume that players observe what has been played in period t before moving on to period t+1 for t=1,2. Find a SPNE such that both players have a total payoff equal to 11