Firm 1 chooses whether to invest, I, or not, N. Firm 2 observes Firm 1's choice and then decides between entering and staying out; specifically, it chooses either E or O after I, and either e or o after N. After Firm 2's choice of O and o, the game ends; payoffs are (2; 0) after O and (3; 0) after o. If Firm 2 enters, then Firm 1 chooses between high and low prices. Specically, after E Firm 1 chooses between H and L and after e it chooses between h and l. Payoffs are (0; 1) after H; (1;-2) after L; (1; 1) after h; (0;-1) after l. A. The subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is (NHh;Ee) B. The subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is (IHh;Ee) C. The subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is (ILh;Oe) D. The subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is (NLh;Oo)