Firm 1. For example, if (p1 = 2,p2 = 3) then Firm 1's protequals (3 2) X 2 = 2 and Firm 2's prot is zero because its price is higher and will sell zero quantity. 0 If p1 > p; then Firm 1 receives payoff zero and Firm 2 receives a payoff equal to (3 ppz. This is just the opposite of the above case. a If ,0] = p2 = p then both rms receive the same payo @. In this case, the two prices are equal, and each rm sells a quantity equal to half of market demand (3 p)/2, namely they split the total demand equally. Answer the following questions. (a) Construct the 4 x 4 payoff matrix. (b) Is there any weakly or strictly dominant strategy for either player? If so, nd them all. (c) Is there any weakly or strictly dominated strategy for either player? If 30, nd them all. (d) Find all of the Nash equilibria using best responses