Firm 2 X Y 2 X 7 Firm 1 9 5 Y 6 12 29. Consider the following statements: (as usual, the first letter denotes the choice of the row player, Firm 1; the second letter denotes the choice of the column player, Firm 2) I. Both firms have a dominant strategy II. (Y, X ) is the only Nash equilibrium of the game III. Both firms have a dominated strategy IV. (Y. Y) is the only Nash equilibrium of the game A. I and III are true; II and IV are false B. I and III are false; II and IV are true C. I, II, and III are true; IV is false D. I and III are false; II is false, and IV is true E. None of the other choices is correctFirm 2 X Y 2 X 4 7 Firm 1 9 5 Y 6 12 30. What is the maximum amount that Firm 1 should be willing to pay to change the game so that it is able to move first? A. 0 B. 1 C. 2 D. 3 E. None of the above is correct