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Find the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the following game (the payoffs are von Neumann-Morgenstern payoffs): 3 b C A B E D E H L D E D 2 3 G M N M N F G F G F G F G F G F Y 0 0 6 3 w 4 Player I's payoff 4 4 6 4 0 2 5 6) O Player 2's payoff 4 O Player 3's payoff 1 2 2 4 3 0 2Q1.1(a) 1 Point Which of the following are possible strategies of Player 2 in this game? Select all correct options. DDE at left info set, MM at right info set [_] EDE at left info set, MN at right info set E at left info set, N at right info set D at left info set, M at right info set Q1.2 (b) 1 Point What is Player 1's equilibrium strategy in the subgame perfect equilibrium? (U pure strategy (A at left info set, L at right info set) () mixed strategy A B %; 0 % at left info set, H L % % at right info set () mixed strategy 4 B & % 0 % at left info set, H. L % % at right info set (U pure strategy (C at left info set, H at right info set) () mixed strategy 4 B O % % % at left info set, H L % % at right info set Q1.3 1(c) 1 Point What is Player 2's equilibrium strategy in the subgame perfect equilibrium? ) mixed strategy D K % % at left info set, M N % % at right info set () pure strategy (D at left node, M at right info set) (O mixed strategy D E % at left info set, M. N % i at right info set () mixed strategy D E % % at left info set, M N % % at right info set (U pure strategy (E at left node, N at right info set) Q1.4 1(d) 1 Point What is Player 3's equilibrium strategy in the subgame perfect equilibrium? O pure strategy (a at top info set, G at bottom info set) O pure strategy (b at top info set, Fat bottom info set) O mixed strategy b at top info set, at bottom info set O pure strategy (a at top info set, Fat bottom info set) O mixed strategy a b at top info set, at bottom info set