For 15-16; Assume there are three alternatives (x, y, z) and four individuals. Assume that each individual votes by submitting a ballot which strictly ranks the three alternatives (i.e., has one alternative ranked first, has one alternative ranked second and has the remaining alternative ranked last). Consider the following social choice correspondence: W If y is ranked first on a majority of the ballots, then y will be selected; If z is ranked first on a majority of the ballots, then z will be selected; Otherwise, x will be selected. 15. Is the requirement of unrestricted preferences for a social choice correspondence satisfied? Is the requirement of Pareto Consistency for a social choice correspondence satisfied? O Yes, No O No, No Yes, Yes O No, Yes Question 16 2 p 16. Is the requirement of independence of irrelevant alternatives for a social choice correspondence satisfied? Is the requirement of non-dictatorship for a social choice correspondence satisfied? O No, No O No, Yes Yes, Yes