For a certain model of used car, 10% of all owners value their cars at $20,000, 45% at $15,000, 30% at $10,000, and 15% at $5,000. Suppose a buyer values any car at 1.4 times its value to the seller. However, while each seller is aware of the value of his car, all used cars appear identical to a buyer. a. If all four types of used cars are traded, what is the highest price a buyer would be willing to pay, given that he cannot tell which type of car he is getting ahead of time? Can there be an equilibrium in which all four types are sold? b. Can there be an equilibrium in which the three lowest types of used cars are sold? What is the range of prices that will support mutually beneficial trade in this case? c. Argue that adverse selection causes this market to partially unravel, such that only the worst used trucks are traded in any equilibrium