For each of the following questions, please consider the following simultaneous-move game: Goalie Shooter Dive Left Dive Right Goalie: 5 Goalie: 1 Aim Left Shooter: 2 Shooter: 3 Goalie: 2 Goalie: 4 Aim Right Shooter: 5 Shooter: 2 1) What is the Shooter's best response to the goalie diving left? a. Aim right b. Aim left 2) What is the Shooter's best response to the goalie diving right? a. Aim right b. Aim left 3) Does this game have a pure-form Nash equilibrium? a. yes b. no 4) In a mixed-strategy equilibrium, with what probability should the GOALIE dive RIGHT? 3. 2596 b. 509% C. 7586