For the past $40$ years, companies have attempted to attract, retain, and encourage managers by developing attractive compensation packages. These compensation packages have also been intended to reduce potential agency conflicts between these managers and the firm's shareholders.

In the best interest of shareholders, compensation packages should be structured in a way such that managers have an incentive to maximize the $$ value of the company's common stock price.

In addition to well$-$designed executive compensation packages, two other motivational forces can align the interests of managers with those of their shareholders. Which of the following actions could be used to reduce the potential for these agency conflicts and ensure that the firm's managers will pursue the long$-$term wealth interests of their shareholders?

$$ Let the manager know that a takeover is possible if he or she doesn't perform well.

Let the manager know that he or she will be fired if the company's stock does not reach a certain target by the end of the year.

In the late $1980$ s and early $1990$ s$,$ Congress passed legislation making it more difficult for outside investors to stage hostile takeovers. This legislation likely $$ conflicts between managers and stockholders.