For the remaining parts, consider group lending. Borrowers form pairs homogeneously. A borrower who succeeds pays (1+r)L. A borrower who succeeds and whose partner fails makes an additional payment of bL. Assume projects succeed or fail independently of each other. Now assume r = 30% and b = 90%, that is, 90% of the partner's loan principal must be paid by a borrower who succeeds and whose partner fails. g. Find the effective interest rate for a borrower with pi=0.9. Find the effective interest rate for a borrower with pi=0.7. For each, how does this interest rate compare with that of parts b. and d.? h. For both borrowers, what is their expected net payoff to borrowing? Which types will borrow? Justify your answer. i. In words, briefly explain how group lending can overcome the adverse selection problem. Reference your results on risk-pricing derived in parts b., d., and part g. here