For this problem, assume that we are in the same situation as problem #2, but the league does not merge. Instead they try to attempt to collude and act as a monopoly, even though there are two distinct leagues. 1. What is the best response of the AFL if the NFL chooses the collusive quantify of games (i.e., half the monopoly quantity)? 2. How much profit does the AFL earn if it sets the number of games you found above? 3. Is collusion an equilibrium of a static game? 4. Find the value of the discount rate such that collusion would be an equilibrium of an infinitely repeated game played by the XFL and the NFL. (round to nearest 0.00) For this problem, assume that we are in the same situation as problem #2, but the league does not merge. Instead they try to attempt to collude and act as a monopoly, even though there are two distinct leagues. 1. What is the best response of the AFL if the NFL chooses the collusive quantify of games (i.e., half the monopoly quantity)? 2. How much profit does the AFL earn if it sets the number of games you found above? 3. Is collusion an equilibrium of a static game? 4. Find the value of the discount rate such that collusion would be an equilibrium of an infinitely repeated game played by the XFL and the NFL. (round to nearest 0.00)