Ford and Chrysler both employ managers, and Chrysler is a potential raider of Ford. Suppose that a Ford manager's output is: QF = M + S and the same manager's output at Chrysler, if successfully raided from Ford, would be QC = M. M represents the manager's general ability and S is Ford-specific ability, where S can be positive, negative, or zero. Suppose Ford knows QF and Chrysler knows QC but Ford does not know how much of the manager's output is due to general skills, M, and how much is due to Ford-specific skills, S. Neither firm knows how much the manager will produce in the other firm. Ford currently pays all managers a wage of W, that Chrysler knows. Both M and S are independent random variables. M is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, and S is uniformly distributed between -1/2 and . Chrysler cannot tell whether a raid will succeed until it tries to raid, since Chrysler does not observe QF and therefore does not know how much the manager is worth to Ford. Finally, assume that to embark on a raid, Chrysler incurs a cost of K and that Ford knows this. You can think