Fountain Corporations economists estimate that good and bad business environments are equally likely for the coming year. The managers of the company must choose between two mutually exclusive projects. Assume that the project the company chooses will be the companys only activity and that the company will close one year from today. The company is obligated to make a $3,800 payment to bondholders at the end of the year. The projects have the same systematic risk but different volatilities. Consider the following information about the two projects:

EconomyProbabilityLow-Volatility Project PayoffHigh-Volatility Project PayoffBad.50$ 3,800$ 3,200Good.50$ 4,150$ 4,757

Suppose bondholders are fully aware that stockholders might choose to maximize equity value rather than total company value and opt for the high-volatility project. To minimize this agency cost, the company's bondholders decide to use a bond covenant to stipulate that the bondholders can demand a higher payment if the company chooses to take on the high-volatility project. What payment to bondholders would make stockholders indifferent between the two projects?