further explanation

Question Three - Hawk Dove Bourgeois game Consider a Hawk Dove Bourgeois game having the payoff matrix as indicated below: Hawk Dove Bourgeois Hawk (v-c)/2, (v-c)/2 v. 0 v/2 + (v-c)/4, (v-c)/4 Dove 0, v v/2, v/2 v/4, v/2+v/4 Bourgeois (v-c)/4, v/2 + (v-c)/4 v/2+v/4, v/4 v/2, v/2 where c = 9, v = 5. a) Find the Nash equilibrium(s) of this game. 3 marks b) Is there an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) in this game? Reason your answer. 5 marks c) Suppose a yacht with a few Hawk types washed up on the shores of an island whose (large) population was entirely Bourgeois. Can Hawk types invade the mixed population of the Island? Explain. 2 marks