Game theory help

Question 4 Consider the Stackelberg game of sequential quantity choice where firm 1 moves first and firm 2 is the follower. After firm 1 sets a quantity (q1), firm 2 chooses it's quantity (q2) after observing firm 1's choice. The demand function in the market is given by: p=12q1q2 Suppose that the production cost is zero for each firm. Find the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. What is the market price and profit for each firm in this equilibrium? Question 5 There are two players and suppose that player 2 has complete information about it's two types: type L and type H. Type L loves going out with player 1 whereas type H hates it. Player 1 has only one type and is uncertain about player 2 's type and believes the two types are equally likely. The two actions available to each player is: {F,B}. The payoff matrices are as follows: type L Player 1 chooses a row between F (upper row) and B (lower row). Player 2 chooses a column between F (left column) and B (right column). What is the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game