Game Theory

Porsche vs. Targa

The next questions refer to the following game. Porsche and Ferrari compete in the sports car market with new models. Below table shows the firms strategies and payoffs.

Porsche

Targa

Carrera

Ferrari

California

1,2

4,3

Spider

2,1

3,6

Question 31(1 point)

If Ferrari thinks that Porsche launches the Targa, then Ferrari's best strategy would be to launch the

Question 31 options:

Targa

Carrera

California

Spider

Question 32(1 point)

If Ferrari thinks that Porsche launches the Carrera, then Ferrari's best strategy would be to launch the

Question 32 options:

Targa

Carrera

California

Spider

Question 33(1 point)

For Ferrari, launching the Spider is

Question 33 options:

a dominant strategy

not a dominant strategy

a Ciao Bella strategy

not a Ciao Bello strategy

Question 34(1 point)

For Porsche, launching the Carrera is a

Question 34 options:

a dominant strategy

not a dominant strategy

Vorsprung-durch-Technik strategy

None of the above.

Question 35(1 point)

The Nash equilibrium of the game is

Question 35 options:

California-Targa

California-Carrera

Spider-Targa

Spider-Carrera

Question 36(1 point)

The Nash equilibrium of the game is

Question 36 options:

not a prisoner's dilemma

the social optimum

a prisoner's dilemma

the result of each car manufacturer having a dominant strategy

Question 37(1 point)

Assume cooperation were possible. Which deal between Porsche and Ferrari would allow for reaching the social optimum?

Question 37 options:

None. No cooperation already leads to the social optimum.

Porsche pays Ferrari $2 to launch the Spider instead of the California.

Ferrari pays Porsche $1 to launch the Targa instead of the Carrera.

Both b. and c. are correct.

Game Theory Porsche vs. Targa The next questions refer to the following game. Porsche and Ferrari compete in the sports car market with new models. Below table shows the firms strategies and payoffs. Porsche Targa Carrera California 1,2 4,3 Ferrari Spider 2,1 3,6 Question 31 (1 point) If Ferrari thinks that Porsche launches the Targa, then Ferrari's best strategy would be to launch the O Targa O Carrera O California Spider Question 32 (1 point) If Ferrari thinks that Porsche launches the Carrera, then Ferrari's best strategy would be to launch the O Targa O Carrera O California O Spider Question 33 (1 point) For Ferrari, launching the Spider is O a dominant strategy O not a dominant strategy a Ciao Bella strategy not a Ciao Bello strategyQuestion 34 (1 point) For Porsche, launching the Carrera is a O a dominant strategy not a dominant strategy O Vorsprung-durch-Technik strategy O None of the above. Question 35 (1 point) The Nash equilibrium of the game is O California-Targa California-Carrera O Spider-Targa O Spider-Carrera Question 36 (1 point) The Nash equilibrium of the game is not a prisoner's dilemma the social optimum O a prisoner's dilemma O the result of each car manufacturer having a dominant strategy Question 37 (1 point) Assume cooperation were possible. Which deal between Porsche and Ferrari would allow for reaching the social optimum? O None. No cooperation already leads to the social optimum. Porsche pays Ferrari $2 to launch the Spider instead of the California. O Ferrari pays Porsche $1 to launch the Targa instead of the Carrera. Both b. and c. are correct