game theory question please help in a hurry

QUESTION 3 There is a society of seven individuals, {1, 2, 3,4, 5,6, 7}, who are connected in a social network as below. If there is a link between two individuals, then that pair of individuals are friends. If there is no link between two individuals, then that pair are not friends. All individuals like Netflix. Specifically, if someone views Netflix they get a benefit of 1. However, Netflix is costly which is bad. To purchase a Netflix account costs c E (D, 1). Netflix allow multiple devices to stream simultaneously. This means that if some indi- vidual purchases a Netflix account, then hefshe will share with all of hisfher friends. Each individual has strategy set {I}, 1} where 1 means to purchase a Netflix account and 0 means to not purchase. The payoff to individual 1' depends directly on what histher friends do. Writing 5.- for the strategy of person i, and 34 for the vector of strategies of everyone other than i, the payoff to person i, (5,, s_,-} is _ 0 _ _ 1, if some friend chose to purchase an account 7'\" '5\") 0, if no friend chose to purchase an account ari'g(1,s_) : 1 o, for all s_.- {a} Answer the following. i. Does any player have a dominant strategy (strictly or weakly)? If yes, what is it? If not, say why not. (2 Marks} ii. Does any player have a dominated strategy (strictly or weakly)? (2 Marks} iii. Find all the pure strategy nash equilibria. (Either write out mathematically or depict graphically.) (8 Marks} Netfllx with constrained sharing Now suppose that Netflix change their sharing policy. The purchaser of a Netflix ac- count is now only allowed to share with a fixed number of others. Specifically, each Netflix account may only be viewed by the account purchaser and n other people. If an account holder has (strictly) more than it friends then hefshe must choose exactly a: to oer access to. If an account holder has less than is friends then helshe will offer access to all of them. Suppose that the social network is unchanged. That is, it remains like this: {b} Answer the following. iv. Write out the strategy set for player 1 for rc = 1, 2, and 3. (3 Marks) Write out the strategy set for player 3 for rc = 1, 2, and 3. (3 Marks) Find all the pure strategy nash equilibria for m = 1, 2, and 3. (Either write out mathematically or depict graphically.) (8 Marks) Suppose that every individual has a strictly positive value of m but that rc can be different for different people. (That is, x,- > D for all i = 1, . . . ,7.) What is the lowest number of individuals that must purchase Netllix in order for everyone to have access to Netflix (i.e., what is the most efficient equilibrium outcome)? And give an example of values for each person's n that attains this. {That is, specify a value of x,- for each person i such that the most efficient outcome is an equilibrium.) (7 Marks)