Give an example of an auction (i.e., a set of bidders, true values, and bids) with 5 bidders that satisfies each property. Explain why your auction satisfies the desired property. Note: Each property is independent (so you need a different example for each part, and the example in, say, part c only needs to satisfy property c and not also the other properties). a. The winner in a first-price sealed-bid auction has a payoff of 10. b. The winner in a second-price sealed-bid auction has a payoff of 10. c. All bidders have the same payoff from a first-price sealed-bid auction as from second-price sealed-bid auction. d. The average payoff in a sealed-bid all-price auction (i.e., whoever bids the highest wins the item, but everyone has to pay their bid) is 5. e. Two of the losers in a first-price sealed-bid auction could have improved their payoff if they had known the other players' bids upfront, but the other two could not have done so