Good diagrams and explanations please

1)

Summarize the major difficulties of the present-aim and self- interest standards of rationality and definitions

2)

Consider the following general form of the hawk-dove game: there is a resource of value V; if two doves meet, they will split the resource. If a hawk and a dove meet, then the hawk will take the entire resource; if two hawks meet, then they will fight; the loser of the hawk fight pays a cost C, and the winner gets the resource V (each hawk expects to win with probability 50%).

1. a)Write down the payoff matrix for this game (use the expected payoff for hawks)
2. b)What assumptions on the values V & C are necessary to ensure that this is truly a hawk-dove game (i.e. to ensure that the players do not have dominant strategies)?
3. c)Given the assumptions from part (b), what is the equilibrium proportion of hawks (h) in the population?