Hawk and Dove Suppose there are two behaviors amongst individuals in a population. Individuals can be 'Hawks' or 'Doves'. Hawks escalate a fight until one individual is injured. Doves shy away from conflict and interactions rarely end in injury. C=3 The Cost Outweighs the Benefit: BC Player 2 Hawk Dove B - C 0 Hawk B -CB -C 2 (B, O) 2 2 - Player 1 (0, B) B 2- Dove BY (2'2 Hawk is the dominant strategy, and the Nash Equilibrium corresponds to Player 2 both players playing Hawk. Hawk Dove Hawk NF ( 2, 0 ) This looks like the Prisoner's Player 1 Dilemma. Dove 10, 2) The Benefit Outweighs the Cost: B>C Player 2 What happens as the percentage of "Hawks" Hawk Dove in the population increases? Hawk (1/2,1/2) (2,0) p=0.5 -> ECH)= (0.5)(2) + (1-5) (2)= 0.25+1= 1,25 Player 1 pagott of playing Hark in a 50/50 population of Dove (0,2) (1,1) Doves and Hawks is 1.25 p=0.9 ECH ) = (0.9) (t ) + (o. ) ( 2 ) = 0.65 payoff of playing Hook in a population of 80%. Hawks is 0.65. the more tanks the worse the p= 1 - everyone is a Houck. E ( H) = P(+ ) + (12,# (2) - 2 payoff . Inever playing Dare is never best