[Hawk-Dove] The following game has been widely used in evolutionary biology to understand how fighting and display strategies by animals could coexist in a population. For a typical Hawk-Dove game there are resources to be gained (e.g., food, mates, territories), denoted as v. Each of two players can choose to be aggressive, as 1 Hawk (H), or compromising, as Dove (D). If both players choose H then they split the resources but lose some payoff from injuries, denoted as k. Assume that k > v If both choose D then they split the resources but engage in some display of power that carries a display cost d, with d < v. Finally, if player i chooses H while j chooses D then i gets all the resources while j leaves with no benefits and no costs.

Describe this game in a matrix.

Assume that v = 10, k = 6, and d = 4. What outcomes can be supported as pure-strategy Nash equilibria?