Hector v. Watt, 235 F.3d 154 (2000) 235 F.3d 154 United States Court of Appeals. Third Circuit. Eugene HECTOR, Appellant, V. Gordon J. WATT; Alberto Diaz; Richard Davy; Scott Hunter, in their individual and official capacities. No. 00-3084. Argued Oct. 5, 2000. Dec. 13, 2000. As Amended Jan. 26, 2001.Synopsis Plaintiff sued state troopers under $ 1983 for unlawful seizure of hallucinogenic mushrooms from plaintiff's airplane. The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, William L. Standish, J., ruled that plaintiff could not recover litigation costs incurred during his criminal prosecution. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals, Cowen, Circuit Judge, held that victims of unreasonable searches or seizures may recover damages directly related to the invasion of their privacy, but such victims cannot be compensated for injuries that result from the discovery of incriminating evidence and consequent criminal prosecution; abrogating Carter v. Georgevich, 78 F.Supp.2d 332 (D.N.J.2000).OPINION OF THE COURT COWEN, Circuit Judge: In previous criminal proceedings Eugene Hector successfully argued that several state troopers violated the Fourth Amendment when they seized over 80 pounds of hallucinogenic mushrooms from Hector's airplane in Dubois, Pennsylvania. Once the drugs were suppressed and the prosecution dismissed, Hector initiated this $ 1983 action against the four appellees, Officers Gordon Watt, Alberto Diaz, Richard Davy, and Scott Hunter. The officers' request for qualified immunity has already been denied and the order affirmed. Hector v. Watt, 203 F.3d 817 (3d Cir.1999) (unpublished table decision). The narrow issue presented in this appeal is what type of damages Hector can obtain under the Fourth Amendment. Hector has abandoned any claim for damages from the search itself and instead seeks compensation solely for expenses he incurred during his criminal prosecution-$3,500 in bail- bond expenses, $23,000 in attorney's fees, and $2,000 for travel between Pennsylvania and his home in California. The District Court held that Hector could not collect those litigation costs. We will affirm.The Supreme Court has "repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 creates a species of tort liability." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2370, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (quoting Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2542, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Given this close relation between $ 1983 and tort liability, the Supreme Court has said that the common law of torts, "defining the elements of damages and the prerequisites for their recovery, provide[s] the appropriate starting point for inquiry under $ 1983 as well." Heck, 512 U.S. at 483, 114 S.Ct. at 2370 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1049, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)). The Supreme Court applied this rule in Heck to an inmate's $ 1983 suit, which alleged that county prosecutors and a state police officer destroyed evidence. used an unlawful voice identification procedure, and engagedin other misconduct. In deciding whether the inmate could state a claim for those alleged violations, the Supreme Court asked What common-law cause of action was the closest to the inmate's claim and concluded that \"malicious *156 prosecution provides the closest analog}.r because unlike the related cause of action for false arrest or imprisonment, it permits damages for connement imposed pursuant to legal process." Heck, 512 15.8. at 484, 114 S.Ct. at 23.71. Looking to the elements of malicious prosecution, the Court held that the inmate's claim could not proceed because one requirement of malicious prosecution is that the prior criminal proceedings must have terminated in the plaintiff's favor, and the inmate in Heck had not successfully challenged his criminal conviction. Id. Although Hector is not seeking damages for imprisonment following a consiction, as in Heck, he is still seeking to re cover costs incurred while defending against a prosecution, relief that the common law made available exclmively under malicious prosecution. As the Supreme Court has explained, false arrest or imprisonment, the only other cause of action under the common law that could apply to a wrongil arrest and its consequences, provides damages "'up until issuance of process or arraignment, but not more." Id. (quoting W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, 8c D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 888 (5111 ed. 1984)). Hector may believe, plausiblyr enough, that his claim is really more like a simple claim of trespass. We agree that he has not in fact brought a claim for false arrest or malicious prosecution. And for that reason, we do not need to address the complexities of our jurisprudence on malicious prosecution under 1983. Compare Torres 1'. JIcLoughiiu, 163 F.3d 169 (3d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 528 L'.S. 1079, 120 S.Ct. T972 145 L.Ed.2d 672 (2000) (rejecting a claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment), 11ft}? Gallo 1'. C'irj'ofPhiiadelphio, 161 F.3d21? (3d Cii'.1998) (reversing dismissal of a claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment and holding that restrictions on a plainti's liberty post-indictment constituted a seizure triggering Fourth Amendment rights). See also Albi'ight 1: other; 510 us. 266, 272, 114 S.Ct. 807', 807, 12'- L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (rejecting claim for malicious prosecution based on substantive due process); Morkio 1'. Lpper Dublin School Dist, 211 F.3d 782, 79293 (3d Cir.2000) (discussing Albright's impact on 1983 claims for malicious prosecution). Other cases have evaluated various restrictions on malicious prosecution under 1983. See, e.g., 11-11903: 1'. Russo, 212 F.3d T81 (_ 3d Cir.2000)_; Montgomery 1'. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120 (3d Cir.1998); Sliem'ood 1'. _lflilt'lltfii, 113 F.3d 396 (3d Cir.199'.-');Rose 1'. Barrie. 871 F.2d 331 {3d (31121989)