Hello ,
I have attached 2 files labelled question 1a (Project description heading) and 1b( Problem 6-1). Please the answer is required to be done on excel sheet . Please answers 1a should be on excel and 1b already has a template with blanks space for answers. Thanks
This jobin, you will calthis the Points Step Hicesien fill sindit Do asit espy and Stant Joy D19 15. E13 by ung i. cal CiS and the output of din 1. is b.call 013, Copy the fewouh farm call . F13 a firm call IF19 down. The F19 bol G13 G19 C23-123 Selecting Data Bouss DO for the Yeahes, U D12 as the sours sams Selbet doig it. Go to the Add Chant )haveads duyn gu. tab of the Ribbon. Add Best Response Curve of Firm 1 at the chant title. Add Output of firm 2, q2 as the tie for the suicidal axis and Output of firm 1, q1 as the tie for the vraticall an Chant Position. Set the chant bright and width so the cutie chant miss witkin call C23-123 7 .el G26 81.ol K26 9 1.call H27 K27 rshit down. the shoutmu. and o. te king, 18.Problem 61 Use a cell reference or a single formula Where appropriate in order to receive full credit. Do not copy and paste values or type values, as you will not receive full credit for your answers. The inverse market demand curve for a duopoly market is p = 14 - Q = 14 - g 1 - q 1, Where Q is the market output, and q 1 and q 1 are the outputs of Firms 1 and 2 respectively. Each rm has a constant marginal cost of 2 and a xed cost of 4. Consequently, the Nash-Cournot best-response curve for Firm 1 is g 1 = 6 - q 112. p = 14 - Q = 14 - q1 - q2 q1 = 6 - {12:2 MC = 2 PC = 4 a} Calculate the prot-maximizing output for Firm 1 (best response, 3R1), the prot for Firm 1, the market output, and the price for g 2 = 0, 2, ..., 12. Use the scatterplot option in Excel to draw the best-response curve for Firm 1. b} What is the monopoly output and prot for Firm 1? (That is, how much does Firm I produce if Firm 2 does not produce?) IfFirm l expects Firm 2 to produce 10 units of output, would it operate in the long run (given that it can avoid incurring its xed costs by shutting down)? Will it operate in the short run (when its xed cost cannot be avoided)? The monopoly output for Firm 1 is unit(s) and the monopoly prot is . f Firm 2 produces 10 units of output, Firm 1 will in the short run and will in the long run
