Hello, I need help with questions d,e, and g, please? Could someone please help out?

83 QUANTITATIVE BUSINESS 2020-202], MATHEMATICS WEEK6 L R T 3, 2 1,1 B 0,0 2,3 Let's compute ail Nash equilibria in mixed strategies for this game. We denote a mixed strategy for the row player by (t,l t), where t is the probability that the row player chooses pure strategy T, and we denote a mixed strategy for the column player by (i', 1 ) , where i is the probability that the column player chooses pure strategy L. If the column player uses the mixed strategy (i', 1 E) , then what are the best responses for the row player? Well, the expected payoff of playing T is -3+(1e).1=1+2r (6) while the expected payoff of playing B is t-0+(1t)-2=22t (7) So, Tis at least as good a response as B precisely when 1+ 2f 2 2 2.9 (8) which solves for L' 2%. Thus, when i' >% the row player's unique best response is T; when f