hello please answer the following questions:

Assume that there are two electric power plants (firm 1 and firm 2) emitting sulfur dioxide, an air pollutant. They can reduce emissions at the following total costs, where q is tons of emissions abatement by firm 1, and q2 is tons of abatement by firm 2: TAC1 = 7 97 TAC2 = 592 Assume that unregulated emissions are 20 tons for each firm, for a total of 40 tons, where x denotes emissions. That is in the absence of regulation, x1 + X2 = 40. d. Please find the market (aggregate) marginal abatement cost function. Let the total social benefit function for sulfur dioxide pollution abatement be: TSB(Q) = 45 . Q -- Q2. e. What is the efficient level of pollution control (call it Q*)? f. Is the tax you calculated in part (b) just right, too low, or too high to induce the efficient level of abatement? What emission tax would achieve the efficient level of control? g. Now, suppose the regulator chooses to set the efficient standard (from (e)), and to meet the standard by assigning each firm 1/2 of the total emissions abatement (a uniform performance standard). What are total abatement costs for the two firms, combined, under this scenario? Compare the abatement costs of the uniform standard to the abatement costs of the tax from part (f), and explain the difference. h. Now compare the total costs to industry (the total compliance costs) of the tax and the uniform standard - how does your answer differ from the answer to part (g)? Why do we compare the total abatement costs of the tax and the uniform standard, rather than total compliance costs, when determining cost-effectiveness? i. Will firms prefer the standard to the tax, or vice-versa