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Hello, This document that I have doesn't have any questions on it. Can you answer them? I am to use the get free section but

Hello,

This document that I have doesn't have any questions on it. Can you answer them? I am to use the get free section but it's not working. I can't upload the document on here. But here is the document.

1. On one hands, prospective payment system (PPS) may generate incentives to ____ unnecessary health care to maximize profit. On the other hands, PPS would generate incentives to provide ____ than optimal care to maximize profit.

a. reduce; less

b. reduce; more

c. increase; less

d. increase; more

2. Increased HMO competition in an insurance market would _____the prices of non-HMO care because HMOs would skim the _____ patients from other insurers.

a. drive down; healthiest

b. drive down; sickest

c. drive up; healthiest

d. drive up; sickest

3.The "medical arms race" literature suggests that hospitals might compete on the basis of ____ and this may ____ health care expenditures.

a. price; decrease

b. price; increase

c. quality; decrease

d. quality; increase

4. Without government intervention, markets tend to _______ air pollution, and total cost of air pollution is ____ than private cost due to negative externality.

a. under-produce; lower

b. over-produce; lower

c. under-produce; higher

d. over-produce; higher

II. Health insurance provision (5 points each; 15 points total)

5. Suppose that a small firm's employee makeup is 50% married and 50% single. Annual total compensation per employee is $50,000, and the firm offers a single coverage health insurance plan worth $5,000 per year. The firm currently does not offer a family coverage plan. If only the single workers purchase health insurance, wage and non-wage compensation would be ___ and ____, respectively, for single employees.

a. 45,000; 5,000

b. 47,500; 0

c. 47,500; 2,500

d. 47,500; 5,000

6. Given the scenario in question 5, married workers who declined the health insurance plan would earn ______ and _____ for monetary wage and non-monetary compensation, respectively.

a. 45,000; 5,000

b. 47,500; 0

c. 47,500; 2,500

d. 47,500; 5,000

7. Assume that the government mandates that all businesses must offer both a family coverage plan and a single coverage plan so that married people (or two-worker households) have more insurance plan purchase options. The government also mandates that the employer must subsidize at least half of insurance premium for both types of plans. Given that, the firm would have an incentive to:

a. Hire single employees rather than married employees.

b. Replace labor with capital.

c. Provide no health insurance at all.

d. (a), (b), and (c) are correct.

III. Tax treatment policy for health insurance premiums (5 points each; 15 points total)

8. Greg and David earn $800 and $1000 per week, respectively. Greg purchases insurance with average coverage and pays $80 weekly for his insurance premium. On the other hand, David pays $100 per week and purchases a more generous insurance plan. Assume that income tax rate is 20% for both, and there is no income tax treatment for insurance premium. Given that, disposable income is _____ for Greg and _____ for David.

a. 560; 700

b. 560; 720

c. 576; 700

d. 576; 720

9. Assume that the government has introduced a tax treatment policy for health insurance premiums that relieves Greg and David from having to pay income tax on their insurance premiums. Given that the weekly income and income tax rate remain the same, disposable income is now ______ for Greg and _____ for David.

a. 560; 700

b. 560; 720

c. 576; 700

d. 576; 720

10. When we compare disposable incomes in questions 8 and 9, we can tell that an individual with ____ income benefits more from this tax policy because his increase in disposable income is _______.

a. low; lower

b. low; higher

c. high; lower

d. high; higher

IV. Voting paradox (5 points each; 20 points total)

Voter's utility associated with health care expenditure

David:U($300M) > U($200M) > U($100M)

Utility with health care expenditure

Tina: U($200M) > U($100M) > U($300M)

Greg: U($100M) > U($200M) > U($300M)

Health care expenditure

$100M$200M$300M

11. In

, suppose that there are only three committee members, David, Greg, and Tina, on the Omaha department of health services committee. There is no chair. Each committee member has a different preference on annual health care expenditure, which is public information. If committee members make a second-best choice under the majority voting rule, the health care expenditure will ____.

a. be $100M at equilibrium

b. be $200M at equilibrium

c. be $300M at equilibrium

d. not exist

Voter's utility associated with health care expenditure

David:U($300M) > U($200M) > U($100M)

Utility with health care expenditure

Greg: U($100M) > U($300M) > U($200M)

Tina: U($200M) > U($100M) > U($300M)

Health care expenditure

$100M$200M$300M

12. Suppose that David became a committee chair. He wants to maximize the health care expenditure budget. To do so, he brought Greg to his party and now Greg announced that his preference has changed as shown in

. According to the majority voting rule, the equilibrium health care expenditure would _____.

a. be $100M

b. be $200M

c. be $300M

d. not exist

13. In

, David, the chair, can achieve his goal by making the committee members_______.

a. first vote on $100M versus $200M, then vote on the first-round winner and $300M.

b. first vote on $100M versus $300M, then vote on the first-round winner and $200M.

c. first vote on $200M versus $300M, then vote on the first-round winner and $100M.

d. first vote on $100M versus $300M, then vote on the first-round winner and $300M.

14. In

, the mayor is afraid that the health care expenditure is unnecessarily high and appointed Tina as the new committee chair. Tina's goal is to reverse the annual budget to the equilibrium level in Question 11. Unfortunately, Greg insists that his true preference is as shown in
as he is worried about his ethical reputation. To achieve her goal, Tina should make the committee members _____.

a. first vote on $100M versus $200M, then vote on the first round winner and $300M.

b. first vote on $100M versus $300M, then vote on the first round winner and $200M.

c. first vote on $200M versus $300M, then vote on the first round winner and $100M.

d. first vote on $100M versus $300M, then vote on the first round winner and $300M.

V. Hospital advertisement (5 points each; 10 points total)

Hospital B

Advertise

Don't advertise

Hospital A

Advertise

(0.5, 0.5)

(1.5, -0.5)

Don't advertise

(-0.5, 1.5)

(1, 1)

Hospital B

Advertise

Don't advertise

Hospital A

Advertise

(-0.1, -0.1)

(1.1, -0.5)

Don't advertise

(-0.5, 1.1)

(1, 1)

15. Assume that there are two major hospitals in Omaha. Given that the payoff matrix with and

without TV advertisement is shown in

, the dominant strategy at equilibrium is:

a. hospital B advertises and Hospital A does not.

b. hospital A advertises and Hospital B does not.

c. both advertise.

d. neither advertises.

16. Now TV advertising becomes even more costly, and the new payoff is as shown in

.In the new equilibrium, the hospital may have incentive to:

a. increase price to make up the profit loss due to increased advertisement fees.

b. stop TV advertising to minimize profit loss.

c. collude to adjust the amount of TV advertisements.

d. (a) and (c) are correct.

VI. Changes in Medicaid reimburse rate (5 points each; 20 points total)

Price, Medicaid reimbursement rate, and number of inpatients

Number of admitted patients

Demand

MR

Capacity = 800

0400600700800

AC = MC = 10

Price

P2 = 40

P1 = 35

P0 = 30

R2 = 25

R1 = 15

17. Ms. Baker runs a monopoly hospital in a neighborhood where 20 percent of residents are

covered by Medicaid. Average cost and marginal cost is the same at $10 either she admits private patients or Medicaid patients. However, currently Ms. Baker admits private patients only. To maximize her profit, she admits ___ patients at price _____, which provide profit at _____.

a. 400; $40; $12,000.

b. 600; $35; $15,000.

c. 700; $30; $14,000.

d. 800; $10; $0.

18. The state government is concerned that the Medicaid patients travel to the other city to access hospital care and increased the Medicaid reimbursement rate from R1 to R2. Now Ms. Baker decided to admit both private and Medicaid patients. Given that R2 = 25, she admits ___private patients at price ____ as marginal benefit of private patients is _____ than Medicaid reimbursement rate.

a. 400; $30; lower.

b. 400; $40; greater.

c. 600; $35; lower.

d. 600; $40; greater.

19. During the last a few years, the state government has accumulated debts due to high Medicaid reimbursement rates. However, the government is aware that median voters do not like that the government increases tax to support Medicaid patients. As a result, the government reduced the Medicaid reimbursement rate to R1 = 15. Ms. Baker still admits the Medicaid patients, but now she admits ____ Medicaid patients, with Medicaid patients profit being _______ .

a.200; $1,000.

b.200; $4,500.

c.300; $1,000.

d.300; $4,500.

20. Given that there is excess demand among Medicaid patients, the government may have incentives to ______

a. reduce property tax for non-profit hospital.

b. encourage donation to charity care.

c. subsidize travel fee for the Medicaid patients.

d. (a), (b), and (c) are correct.

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