Question
Hello, This document that I have doesn't have any questions on it. Can you answer them? I am to use the get free section but
Hello,
This document that I have doesn't have any questions on it. Can you answer them? I am to use the get free section but it's not working. I can't upload the document on here. But here is the document.
1. On one hands, prospective payment system (PPS) may generate incentives to ____ unnecessary health care to maximize profit. On the other hands, PPS would generate incentives to provide ____ than optimal care to maximize profit.
a. reduce; less
b. reduce; more
c. increase; less
d. increase; more
2. Increased HMO competition in an insurance market would _____the prices of non-HMO care because HMOs would skim the _____ patients from other insurers.
a. drive down; healthiest
b. drive down; sickest
c. drive up; healthiest
d. drive up; sickest
3.The "medical arms race" literature suggests that hospitals might compete on the basis of ____ and this may ____ health care expenditures.
a. price; decrease
b. price; increase
c. quality; decrease
d. quality; increase
4. Without government intervention, markets tend to _______ air pollution, and total cost of air pollution is ____ than private cost due to negative externality.
a. under-produce; lower
b. over-produce; lower
c. under-produce; higher
d. over-produce; higher
II. Health insurance provision (5 points each; 15 points total)
5. Suppose that a small firm's employee makeup is 50% married and 50% single. Annual total compensation per employee is $50,000, and the firm offers a single coverage health insurance plan worth $5,000 per year. The firm currently does not offer a family coverage plan. If only the single workers purchase health insurance, wage and non-wage compensation would be ___ and ____, respectively, for single employees.
a. 45,000; 5,000
b. 47,500; 0
c. 47,500; 2,500
d. 47,500; 5,000
6. Given the scenario in question 5, married workers who declined the health insurance plan would earn ______ and _____ for monetary wage and non-monetary compensation, respectively.
a. 45,000; 5,000
b. 47,500; 0
c. 47,500; 2,500
d. 47,500; 5,000
7. Assume that the government mandates that all businesses must offer both a family coverage plan and a single coverage plan so that married people (or two-worker households) have more insurance plan purchase options. The government also mandates that the employer must subsidize at least half of insurance premium for both types of plans. Given that, the firm would have an incentive to:
a. Hire single employees rather than married employees.
b. Replace labor with capital.
c. Provide no health insurance at all.
d. (a), (b), and (c) are correct.
III. Tax treatment policy for health insurance premiums (5 points each; 15 points total)
8. Greg and David earn $800 and $1000 per week, respectively. Greg purchases insurance with average coverage and pays $80 weekly for his insurance premium. On the other hand, David pays $100 per week and purchases a more generous insurance plan. Assume that income tax rate is 20% for both, and there is no income tax treatment for insurance premium. Given that, disposable income is _____ for Greg and _____ for David.
a. 560; 700
b. 560; 720
c. 576; 700
d. 576; 720
9. Assume that the government has introduced a tax treatment policy for health insurance premiums that relieves Greg and David from having to pay income tax on their insurance premiums. Given that the weekly income and income tax rate remain the same, disposable income is now ______ for Greg and _____ for David.
a. 560; 700
b. 560; 720
c. 576; 700
d. 576; 720
10. When we compare disposable incomes in questions 8 and 9, we can tell that an individual with ____ income benefits more from this tax policy because his increase in disposable income is _______.
a. low; lower
b. low; higher
c. high; lower
d. high; higher
IV. Voting paradox (5 points each; 20 points total)
David:U($300M) > U($200M) > U($100M)
Utility with health care expenditure
Tina: U($200M) > U($100M) > U($300M)
Greg: U($100M) > U($200M) > U($300M)
Health care expenditure
$100M$200M$300M
11. In
a. be $100M at equilibrium
b. be $200M at equilibrium
c. be $300M at equilibrium
d. not exist
David:U($300M) > U($200M) > U($100M)
Utility with health care expenditure
Greg: U($100M) > U($300M) > U($200M)
Tina: U($200M) > U($100M) > U($300M)
Health care expenditure
$100M$200M$300M
12. Suppose that David became a committee chair. He wants to maximize the health care expenditure budget. To do so, he brought Greg to his party and now Greg announced that his preference has changed as shown in
a. be $100M
b. be $200M
c. be $300M
d. not exist
13. In
a. first vote on $100M versus $200M, then vote on the first-round winner and $300M.
b. first vote on $100M versus $300M, then vote on the first-round winner and $200M.
c. first vote on $200M versus $300M, then vote on the first-round winner and $100M.
d. first vote on $100M versus $300M, then vote on the first-round winner and $300M.
14. In
a. first vote on $100M versus $200M, then vote on the first round winner and $300M.
b. first vote on $100M versus $300M, then vote on the first round winner and $200M.
c. first vote on $200M versus $300M, then vote on the first round winner and $100M.
d. first vote on $100M versus $300M, then vote on the first round winner and $300M.
V. Hospital advertisement (5 points each; 10 points total)