Hello, this is the Second part of the test, I need a solution for b, c and d.

U \\JU 10 45 15 42.5 20 40 25 37.5 30 35 b) (30 points) Please use the best response function of each duopolist and obtain the output levels that will be produced in a Cournot equilibrium, and the price level in such an equilibrium. Please provide the rationale for why the intersect of the two best response functions is the Cournot equilibrium. 0) (30 points) Applying game theory, please first ll in the payoff (profit) of each duopolist given the quantity output chosen in the table (normal form game) below. Once you have completed the payoffs in the table, please determine the Nash equilibrium and verify that the Nash equilibrium is the same as the Cournot equilibrium you found in (b). 023 strategy y2=0 y2=12.5 y2 = 20 y2= 30 D1 '5 y1 =25 ( . ) (1012.5, 625) (750, 700) (500, 450) strategy y1=20 (1200,0) (950.5375) ( , ) (300,300) y1=17.5(1137_5,0)(913_75,713.75)(737_5,350)( , ) y1=12.5 (937.5, 0) (731.2573) .25) (537.5, 950) (532.5, 325) d) (30 points) If both duopolistsdecide to cooperate, (1') Will the cooperation be sustained if both duopolists decide to produce monopoly quantity together (each produces half)? If yes, why? And if not, why not?(Hint: You could use the information provided in c))