Help with this question is needed!!

BurgerCo (Firm 1) and CakeShop Led (Firm 2) offer differentiated products with market demands given by 41 = 100-2p1 + p2 and 92 = 100-2p2 + pi, respectively. Firms are choosing their prices. Suppose that both firms have a marginal cost of 50. (a) Calculate and draw the best response functions for both firms. What can you say about the firms' strategies, are their choices strategic substitutes or complements? (b) Find the Nash equilibrium. Compute the firms' profits. (c) Suppose now that the products are not differentiated so they compete a la Bertrand (recall this is a situation in which firms are choosing prices, and the firm that offers the lower price seizes all demand) with market demand function given by q = 100-p. Which are the Nash equilibria? (d) Still assuming competition a la Bertrand as in (c), argue what would change in the equilibrium of the following situations (no computations required, but you can provide them if you want): (i) Firm 1's marginal cost is still 50, but firm 2's marginal cost is 30. (ii) A third firm with the same marginal cost of 50 enters the market