here's my question

Firm 1 and rm 2 compete with each other by setting the price. For each rm 1', its demand depends on its own price p.- and the price of its opponent p_,;. The demand function can be written as 1 91' = 20 Pa' + 59i- The marginal cost is constant at $4 for both rms. There is no xed cost. Firm 1 and rm 2 set their prices every year. In each year, there is probability 1 6 that this market dies and their relationship ends. Assume no discounting. Answer the following questions. 1. Suppose 6 = 0 (this is a one-shot sirnutaneous game), compute the equilibrium prices, quan tities and prots for both rms. 2. Suppose r5 = 0. If the two rms work together and collusively choose a price 330 to maximize the joint prot, what is 330? 3. Consider the collusion where they both set the price as pg and split the joint prot evenly. For what values of 6 will their collusion be sustainable by using a \"Grim 'I'rigger\" strategy? 4. For what values of 6 will their collusion be sustainable by using a \"prefect TitforTa \" strategy