Hi,

Could you please help me with the solutions for these questions? I want to study for an exam but I am struggling to understand and solve these questions. I am really stuck. Any help is vastly appreciated! The questions are attached as images.

Assuming Depositor 1 could choose first, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium would be: (Withdraw; Withdraw) Assuming Depositor 1 could choose first, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium would be: (Withdraw,- Don't withdraw). Assuming Depositor 1 could choose first, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium would be: (Don't withdraw; Withdraw). Assuming Depositor 1 could choose first, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium would be: (Don't withdraw; Don't withdraw). The sequential version of this game has no subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 10. Which of the following statement(s) is (are) correct? Now let the payoff matrix of this game be Depositor 2 Withdraw Don't withdraw Depositor 1 a) bi C) d) Withdraw 25; 25 50; 0+b Don't withdraw 0+a; 50 110; 110 Both players have a dominant strategy, Don't withdraw, provided that 3225 and b225. Assume a225 and b225, then the game has two Nash equilibria: (Withdraw, Withdraw), and (Don't withdraw, Don't withdraw). Assume 3225 and b225, then we can expect the players to choose (Don't withdraw; Don't withdraw) in equilibrium. Assume a225 and b