Hi!

Please can you help me with the question below?

i just don't seem to understand nor get it right.

your help would be greatly appreciated.

Also, if you don't mind explaining, that would be amazing. however, if you do; it's okay!

Thanks and God bless

itial+block@137d1223701c488a9635... Answers are displayed within the problem Problem PS7.1.3 1 point possible (graded) Acme and Tartine are identical bakeries and are the only suppliers of baguettes in San Francisco. They have agreed to form a cartel: they jointly sell Q - 16 baguettes and charge p = 9. Each bakery shall produce half of the joint quantity. Acme is tempted to cheat on the cartel agreement and increase its own production by 2 units. Acme knows that if they cheat, there is a 50% chance Tartine will catch them and force them to pay a fine of F that is taken out from their profits. If the market demand curve is Q - 34 - 2P and the marginal cost of producing baguettes is constant and equal to 1 (assume there are no fixed costs), how big does F have to be to make Acme indifferent between cheating and not? F Save Submit You have used 0 of 2 attempts IMG_8357.jpg IMG_8356.jpg IMG_8358.jpg Open file Open file Open file