hi what about c)?

1) An economy has two types of jobs, Good and Bad, and two types of workers, Qualified and Unqualified. The population consists of 60% Qualified and 40% Unqualified. In a Bad job, both type of worker produces 10 units of output. In a Good job, a Qualified worker produces 100 units, and an Unqualified worker produces 0 . There is enough demand for workers that for each type of job, companies must pay what they expect the appointee to produce. Companies must hire each worker without observing his type and pay him before knowing his actual output. But Qualified workers can signal their qualification by getting educated. For a Qualified worker, the cost of getting educated to level n is, whereas for an Unqualified worker, it is 4 . These costs are measured in the same units as output, and n must be an integer. a) What is the minimum level of n that will achieve separation? What is the payoff to qualified and unqualified workers under signalling? b) In the absence of any signalling, how much would workers get for each type of job? If you were a qualified worker, show why you prefer the situation where signals are made available to not? Suppose the cost of education for the Unqualified worker is halved, i.e. . c) What is the new minimum level of that will be required for separation? Would the qualified worker still prefer the situation where signals are made available? [4+4+4= 12 marks]